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the power of the atomic bomb is beyond belief
Tagasaki Prefecture Report
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FOREWORD
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey
was established by the Secretary of War on 3 N0-
vember 1944, pursuant to a directive from the late
President Roosevelt. Its mission was to conduct
an impartial and expert study of the effects of our
aerial attack on Germany, to be used in connection
with air attacks on Japan and to establish a basis
for evaluating the importance and potentialides
of ail' power as an instrument of military strategy,
for planning the future development of the United
States armed forces, and for determining future
economic policies with respect to the national de-
fense. A summary repol't and some 200 supporting
reports containing the findings of the Survey in
Germany have been published.
On 15 August 1945, President Truman requested
that the Survey conduct a similar study of the
effect of all types of air attack in the war against
Japan, submitting reports in duplicate to the Sec-
retary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy.
The officers of the Survey during its Japanese
phase were:
Franklin D'Olier, Chairman.
Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Vice
Chairmen.
Walter Wilds, Secretary.
Harry L. Bowman.
J. K. Galbraith.
Rensis Likert.
Frank A. McNamee.
Fred Searls, Jr.
Monroe Spaght.
Dr. Louis R. Thompson.
Theodore P. Wright, Directors.
The Survey's complement provided for 300 civil-
III
ians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The mili-
tary segment of the organization was drawn from
the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and from the
Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Both the Army
and Navy gave the Survey all possible assistance
in furnishing men, supplies, transport, and infor-
mation. The Survey operated from headquarters
in Tokyo early in September 1945, with subhead-
quarters In Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Naga-
saki, and with mobile teams operating in other
parts of Japan, the islands of the .Pacific and the
Asiatic mainland.
It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime
Japanese military planning and execution, en-
gagement by engagement and campaign by cam-
paign, and to secure reasonably accurate statistics
on Japan's economy and war production, plant by
plant and industry by industry. In addition,
studies were conducted on Japan's over-aU strategic
plans and the background of her entry into the
war, the internal discussions and negotiations
leading to her acceptance of unconditional sur-
render, the course of health and morale among the
civilian population, the effectiveness of the J apa-
nese civilian defense organization and the effects
of the atomic bombs. Separate reports will be
issued covering each phase of the study.
The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japa-
nese military, government, and industrial officials.
It also recovered and translated many documents
which have not only been useful to the Survey, but
will also furnish data valuable for other studies.
Arrangements are being made to tu~n over the
Survey's files to a permanent Government agency
where they will be available for further examina-
tion and distribution.
J..[ ,.....
•
1. INTRODUCTION
The available facts about the power of the
atomic bomb as a military weapon lie in the
story of what it did at Hiroshima and J agasaki.
Many of these facts have been published, in
official and unofficial form, but mingled ,,-ith dis-
tortions or errors. The United States Strategic
Bombing Survey, therefore, in partial fulfillment
of the mission for which it was established, has
put together in these pages a fairly full account of
just ,,-hat the atomic bombs did at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. Together with an explanation of how
the bomb achieved these effects, this report states
the extent and nature of the damage, the casualties,
and the political repercussions from the two at-
tacks. The basis is the observation, measurement,
and analysis of the Survey's investigators. The
conjecture that is necessary for understanding of
complex phenomena and for applying the findings
to the problems of defense of the United States is
clearly labelled.
When the atomic bombs fell, the United States
Strategic Bombing Survey was completing a study
of the effects of strategic bombing on Germany's
ability and will to resist. A similar study of the
effects of strategic bombing on Japan was being
planned. The news of the dropping of the atomic
bomb gave a new urgency to this project, for a
study of the air war against Japan clearly involved
new weapons and new possibilities of concentra-
tion of attack that might qualify or even change
the conclusions and recommendations of the Sur-
vey as to the effectiveness of air power. The di-
rectors of the Survey, therefore, decided to exam-
1
ine exhaustively the effects of the atomic bombs,
in order that the full impact on Japan and the
implications of their results could be confidently
analyzed. Teams of experts "l'"ere selected to study
the cenes of the bombings from the special points
of emphasis of physical damage. civilian defense,
morale, casualties, community life, utilities and
transportation, various industries, and the general
economic and political repercussions. In all, more
than 110 men-engineers, architects, fire experts,
economists, doctors, photoO"raphers. draftsmen-
participated in the field study at each city, over a
period of 10 weeks from October to December,
1945. Their detailed studies are now being pub-
lished.
In addition, close liaison was maintained with
other inve tigating units. Cooperation "l'"as re-
ceived from, and extended to, the following
groups:
The Joint Commission for the Investigation
of the Atomic Bomb in Japan.
The British Mission to Japan.
The Naval Technical fission to Japan.
Special ackno"l'"ledgment is due to the medical
groups of the Joint Conunission, "l'"ho e data and
findings have been generously made available to
the Survey. On medical aspects of the bombings~
the Joint Commission was the chief fact-finding
group; it will present its definitive report in the
near future. In other fields. however-particu-
larly the study of physical damage and the impact
on community life-the Survey collected its own
data and is the primary source.
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II. THE EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS
A. THE ATTACKS AND DAMAGE
1. The attacks.-A single atomic bomb, the first
weapon of its type ever used against a target, ex-
ploded over the city of Hiroshima at 0815 on the
morning of 6 August 1945. Most of the industrial
'yorkers had already reported to work. but many
workers were enroute and nearly all the school
children and some industrial employees were at
work in the open Oil the program of building re-
moval to provide firebre~ks and disperse valuables
to the cOlUltry. The attack came 45 minutes after
the "all clear" had been sounded from a previous
alert. Because of the lack of warning and the
populace's indifference to small groups of planes,
t.he explosion came as an almost complete surprise,
and the people had not taken shelter. Many were
caught in the open, and most of the rest in flim-
sily constructed homes or commercial establish-
ments.
The bomb exploded slightly northwest of the
center of the city. Because of this accuracy and
the flat terrain and circular shape of the city,
Hiroshima was uniformly and extensively dev-
astated. Practically the entire densely or mod-
erately built-up portion of the city was leveled by
blast and swept by fire. A "fire-storm," a phe-
nomenon which has occurred infrequently in other
conflagrations, developed in Hiroshima: fires
springing up almost simultaneously over the wide
flat area around the center of the city drew in ail"
from all directions. The inrush of air easily
overcame the natural ground wind, which had a
velocity of only about 5 miles per hour. The
"fil"e-"ind" attained a maximum Yelocity of 30 to
40 miles per hour 2 to 3 hours after the explosion.
The "fire-wind" and the symmetry of the built-up
center of the city gave a roughly circular shape to
the 4.4 square miles which were almost completely
burned out.
The surprise, the collapse of many buildings,
and the conflagration contributed to an unprece-
dented casualty rate. Seventy to eighty thousand
people were killed, or missing and presumed dead,
710382°--46----2 3
and an equal number were injured. The mag-
nitude of casualties is set in relief by a compari-
son with the Tokyo fire raid of 9-10 March 1945,
in which, though nearly 16 square miles were de-
stroyed, the number killed was no larger, and fewer
people were injured.
At Nagasaki, 3 days later, the city was scarcely
more prepared, though vague references to the
Hiroshima disaster had appeared in the newspaper
of 8 August. From the Nagasaki Prefectural
Report on the bombing, something of the shock
of the explosion can be inferred:
The day was clear with not very much wind--an or-
dinary midsummer's day. The strain of continuous air
attack on the city's population and the severity of tbe
summer bad vitiated entbusiastic ail' raid precautions.
Previously, a general alert had been sounded at 0748,
witb a raid alert at 0750; this was canceled at 0830, and
the alertness of the people was dissipated by a great feel-
ing of relief.
The city remained on the warning alert, but
when two B-29's were again sighted coming in
the raid signal was not given immediately; the
bomb was dropped at 1102 and the raid signal was
given a few minutes later, at 1109. Thus only
about 400 people were in the city's tunnel shelters,
which were adequate for about 30 percent of the
population.
When the atomic bomb exploded, an intense f1asb was
observed first, as though a large amount of magnesium
had been ignited, and the scene grew hazy with white
smoke. At the same time at the center of the explosion,
and a short while later in other areas, a tremendous
roaring sound was heard and a crushing blast wave and
intense heat were felt. The people of Nagasaki, even
those who lived on the outer edge of the blast, all felt as
though they had sustained a direct hit, and the whole
city suffered damage such as would have resulted from
direct hits everywhel'e by ordinary bombs.
The zero area, where the damage was most severe, was
almost completel~' wiped out and for a short while after
the explosion no reports came out of that area. People
who were in comparatively damaged al'eas reported their
condition under the impression that they had received a
direct hit. If such a great amount of damage could be
wreaked by a nea r miss, then the power of the atomic
bomb is unbelievably great.

In Nagasaki, no fire storm arose, and the un-
even terrain of the city confined the maximum in-
tensity of damage to the valley over which the
bomb exploded. The area of nearly complete dev-
astation was thus much smaller; only about 1.8
square miles. Casualties were lower also; between
35,000 and 40,000 were killed, and about the same
number injured. People in the tunnel shelters
escaped injury, unless exposed in the entrance
shaft.
The difference in the totals of destruction to
lives and property at the two cities suggests the
importance of the special circumstances of lay-
out and construction of the cities, which affect the
results of the bombings and must be considered
in evaluating the effectiveness of the atomic bombs.
A.n account of the nature and history of each city
will give meaning to the details of the damage and
di organization at each.
2. Hiroshima.-The city of Hiroshima is lo-
cated on the broad fan-shaped delta of the Ota
River, whose 7 mouths divide the city into 6 islands
which project fingerlike into Hiroshima Bay of
the Inland Sea. These mouths of the river fur-
ni hed excellent firebreaks in a city that is other-
wise flat and only slightly above sea level. A
highly developed bridge system, with 81 important
bridges, joined the islands. A single kidney-
shaped hill in the eastern part of the city, about
one-half mile long and rising to an elevation of
221 feet, offered some blast protection to structures
on the eastern side oppo ite the point of fall of
the bomb. Otherwise, the city was uniformly ex-
posed to the spreading energy from the bomb.
The city boundary extends to some low hills to
the west and northeast and embraces 26.36 square
miles, only 13 of which were buiit up. Seven
square miles were densely or moderately built up,-
the remainder being occupied by sparsely built-up
residential, storage, and transportation areas, veg-
etable farms, water courses, and wooded hilly sec-
tions. In the central area, no systematic separa-
tion of commercial, industrial, and residential
zones existed, though there were rough functional
sections. The main commerciai district was lo-
cated in the center of the city, and with the adjoin-
ing Chugoku Regional Army Headquarters
occupied the greater portion of the central island.
Re idential areas and military barracks over-
lapped and surrounded this central area. The
bulk of the industries was located on the perim-
eter of the city, either on the southern ends of
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the islands (where the Hiroshima airport was
also situated) or to the east of the city. The 4
square miles of densely built-up area in the heart
of the city-residential, commercial, and mili-
tary-eontained three-fifth of the total popula-
tion. If there were, as eems probable, about
245,000 people in the city at the time of the attack,
the density in the congested area must have been
about 35,000 pel' square mile.. Five completed
evacuation programs and a sixth then in progress
had reduced the population from it wartime peak
of 3 0,000.
In Hiro hima (and in Nagasaki also) the dwell-
ings were of wood construction; about one-half
'''ere one story and the remainder either one and
one-half or two stories. The roof coverings were
mostly hard-burnt black tile. There were no ma-
sonry division walls, and large groups of dwellings
clustered together. The type of construction,
coupled with antiquated fire-fighting equipment
and inadequately trained personnel, afforded even
in peacetime a high possibility of conflagration.
Many wood-framed industrial buildings were of
poor construction by American standards. The
principal points of weakness were the extremely
small tenons, the inadequate ten ion joints, and
the inadequate or poorly designed lateral bracing .
Reinforced concrete framed buildings showed a
striking lack of uniformity in design and in quality
of materials. Some of the construction details
(reinforcing rod splices, for example) were often
poor, and much of the concrete was definitely
weak; thus some reinforced concrete buildings col-
lapsed and suffered structural damage when within
2,000 feet of ground zero, and some internal wall
paneling was demolished even up to 3,800 feet.
(For convenience, the term "ground zero" will be
used to designate the point on the ground directly
beneath the point of detonation, or "air zero.")
Other buildings, however, were constructed far
more strongly than is required by no'rmal build-
ing codes in America, to re i t earthquakes. Fur-
thermore, construction regulations in Japan have
specified since the 1923 earthquake that the roof
must safely carry a minimum load of 70 pounds
per square foot whereas American requirements
do not normally exceed 40 pounds per square foot
for similar types. Though the regulation was
not always followed, thi extra strong construc-
tion was encountered in some of the buildings near
ground zero at Hiroshima and undoubtedly ac-
counts for their ability to withstand atomic bomb
pressures without structural failures, Nearly 7
percent of the residential units had been torn down
to make firebreaks.
Hiroshima before the war was the seventh larg-
est city in Japan, with a population of over 340,-
000, and was the principal administrative and
commercial center of the southwestern part of the
country. As the headquarters of the Second Army
and of the Chugoku Regional Army, it was one
of the most important military command stations
in Japan, the site of one of the largest military
supply depots, and the foremost military shipping
point for both troops and supplies. Its shipping
activities had virtually ceased by the time of the
attack, however, because of sinkings and the min-
ing of the Inland Sea. It had been relatively
unimportant industrially before the war, ranking
only twelfth, but during the war new plants were
built that increased its significance. These facto-
ries were not concentrated, but spread over the
outskirts of the city; this location, we shall see,
accounts for the slight industrial damage.
The impact of the atomic bomb shattered the
normal fabric of community life and disrupted
the organizations for handling the disaster. In
the 30 percent of the population killed and the
additional 30 percent seriously injured "ere in-
cluded corresponding proportions of the civic
authorities and rescue groups. A mass flight from
the city took place, as persons sought safety from
the conflJ.gration and a place for shelter and food.
Within 24 hours, however, people were streaming
back by the thousands in search of relatives and
friends and to determine the extent of their prop-
erty loss. Road blocks had to be set up along all
routes leading into the city, to keep curious and
unauthorized people out. The bulk of the de-
housed population found refuge in the surround-
ing contryside; within the city the food supply
was short and shelter virtually nonexistent.
On 7 August, the commander of the Second
Army assumed general command of the counter-
measures, and all military units and facilities in
the area were mobilized for relief purposes. Army
buildings on the periphery of the city provided
shelter and emergency hospital space, and dis-
persed 1-\.rmy supplies supplemented the slight
amounts of food and clothing that had escaped de-
struction. The need far exceeded what could be
made available. Surviving civilians assisted; al-
though casualties in both groups had been heavy,
190 policemen and over 2,000 members of the Civil-
6
ian Defense Corps reported for duty on 7 August.
The status of medical facilities and personnel
dramatically illustrates the difficulties facing au-
thorities. Of more than 200 doctors in Hiroshima
before the attack, over 90 percent were casualties
and only about 30 physicians were able to perform
their normal duties a month after the raid. Out
of 1,780 nurses, 1,654 were killed or injured.
Though some stocks of supplies had been dispersed,
many were destroyed. Only three out of 45 civil-
ian hospitals could be used, and two large Army
hospitals were rendered unusable. Those within
3,000 feet of ground zero were totally destroyed,
and the mortality rate of the occupants was prac-
tically 100 percent. Two large hospitals of rein-
forced concrete construction were located 4,900
feet from ground zero. The basic structuI'es re-
mained erect but there was such severe interior
damage that neither was able to resume operation
as a hospital for some time and the casualty rate
was approximately 90 percent, due primarily to
falling plaster, flying glass, and fire. Hospitals
and clinics beyond 7,000 feet, though often remain-
ing standing, were badly damaged and contained
many casualties from flying glass or other missiles.
With such elimination of facilities and person-
nel, the lack of care and rescue activities at the time
of the disaster is understandable; still, the eyewit-
ness account of Father Siemes 1 shows how this
lack of first-aid contributed to the seriousness of
casualties. At the improvised first-aid stations, he
reports:
• • * Iodine is applied to the wounds but they are
left uncleansed. Neither ointment nor other therapeutic
agents are available. Those that have been brought in are
laid on the floor and no one can give them any further
care. What could one do when all means are lacking?
Among the passersby, there are many who are uninjured.
In a purposeless, insensate manner, distraught by the mag-
nitude of the disaster, most of them rush by and none con-
ceives the thought of organizing help on his own initiative.
They are concerneu only with the welfare of their own
families-in the official aid stations and hospitals, a good
third or half of those that had been brought in died. They
lay about there almost without care, and a very high per-
centage succumbed. E"erything was lacking, doctors, as-
sistants, dressings, drugs, etc. • • •.
Effective medical help had to be sent in from
the outside, and arrived only after a considerable
delay.
Fire-fighting and rescue units were equally
stripped of men and equipment. Father Siemes
1 German-born Jesuit professor at Jochi University, Tokyo; 111
the Hiroshima area when the bomb fell.
HIROSHIMA before alld after bombing. Area around grotmd Ze1·O. 1,000 foot circles.
A. A. F. Photos
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reports that 30 hours elapsed before any organized
rescue parties were observed. In Hiroshima, only
16 pieces of fire-fighting equipment were available
for fighting the conflagration, three of them bor-
rowed. However, it is unlikely that any public
fire department in the world, even without damage
to equipment or casualties to personnel, could have
prevented development of a conflagration in Hiro-
shima, or combatted it with success at more than
a few locations along its perimeter. The total fire
damage would not have been much different.
All utilities and tran portation services were
disrupted over varying lengths of time. In most
cases, however, the demand fell off even more
precipitously than the available supply, and where
the service was needed it could be restored at a
minimal level. Thus, through railroad service was
possible on 8 August, only 2 days after the attack,
when fire trucks still had to be used to pump water
into the locomotives because of insufficient water
pressure. Electric power from the general net-
work was available in most of the surviving parts
of the city on 7 August, and only one plant, the
Engineering Division of Mitsubishi Heavy In-
dustries, was hampered in its recovery by the in-
ability to obtain sufficient power for several weeks.
The water reservoir, which was of reinforced
concrete and earth-covered, was undamaged; it
was nearly 2 miles from the blast center. However,
70,000 breaks of pipe connections in buildings and
dwellings were caused by bla t and fire effects. No
subsurface pipes were crushed and no leaks re-
sulted from blast as a direct cause, though several
leaks in underground mains resulted from falling
debris. Pressure in the city center dropped to zero
because of the connection breaks and the damage
to a 16- and a 14-inch water main where they
crossed damaged bridges. Six sewer pumping
stations were rendered inoperable by fire and blast
within a radius of 1 mile. The remaining eight
stations were only slightly damaged, but no effort
was made to repair or operate them. Water tables
rose at flood periods and lands behind revetments
were inundated.
Trolley cars, trucks, and railroad rolling stock
suffered extensive damage. Transportation build-
ings (offices, stations, living quarters, and a few
\varehouses) were damaged by fire in the passenger
station area, but damage was slight to the round-
houses, transit sheds, warehouses, and repair units
in the classification and repair area. About 200
ra.ilroad employees were killed, but by 20 August,
8
14 days after the attack, 80 percent of the em-
ployees were at work.
The electric power transmission and disti-ibu-
tion system was wrecked; Oilly power equipment of
rugged construction, such as transformers, resisted
the blast and heat within the devastated areas. In-
struments were damaged beyond repair, and
switches, switchyard insulators, cables, and copper
bus work were rendered unusable. The telephone
system was approximately 80 percent damaged,
and no service was restored until 15 August 1945.
Industry in the center of the city was effectively
wiped out. Though small workshop numbered
several thousand, they represented only one-fourth
of the total industrial production of Hiroshima,
since many of them had only one or two workers.
The bulk of the city's output came from large
plants located on the outskirts of the city; one-
half of the in'dustrial production came from only
five firms. Of these larger companies, only one
suffered more than superficial damage. Of their
working force, 94 percent were uninjured. Since
electric power was available, and materials and
working force were not de troyed, plants ordi-
narily responsible for nearly three-fourths of
Hiroshima's industrial production could have re-
sumed normal operation within 30 days of the
attack had the war continued.
Immediately after the attack, the presence of
these nearly intact industries spurred counter-
measures in an effort to retain for the nation's
war effort the potential output of the city. The
prefectural governor issued a proclamation on 7
August, calling for "a rehabilitation of the stricken
city and an aroused fighting spirit to exterminate
the devilish Americans." To prevent the spread
of rumors and brace morale, 210,000 out-of-town
newspapers were brought ln daily to replace the
destroyed local paper. With the surrender, how-
ever, reconstruction took on a slower tempo. On
16 August, regular rationing was resumed. Care
of the injured and disposal of corpses remained
urgent, but other steps were few.
By 1 November, the population of Hiroshima
was back to 137,000. The city required complete
rebuilding. The entire heart, the main adminis-
trative and commercial as well as residentlal sec-
tion, was gone. In this area only about 50 build-
ings, all of reinforced concrete, remained stand-
ing. All of these suffered blast damage and all
save about a dozen were almost completely gutted
by fire; only 5 could be used without major re-
•
••
pairs. These burnt-out structural frames rose
impressively from the ashes of the burned-over
section where occasional piles of rubble or twisted
steel skeletons marked the location of brick or
steel frame structures. At greater distances light
steel frame and brick structures remained un-
damaged. Blast damage to wood-frame buildings
and to residences extended well beyond the burned-
over area, gradually becoming more erratic and
spotty as distances were reached where only the
weakest buildings were damaged, until in the outer
portions of the city only minor disturbances of the
tile roofs or breakage of glass were visible. The
official Japanese figures summed up the building
destruction at 62,000 out of a total of 90,000 build-
ings in the urban area, or 69 percent. An addi-
tional 6,000 or 6.6 percent were severely damaged,
and most of the others showed glass breakage or
disturbance of roof tile. These figures show the
magnitude of the p-roblem facing the survivors.
Despite the absence of sanitation measures, no
epidemics are reported to have broken out. In
view of the lack of medical facilities, supplies, and
per onnel, and the disruption of the sanitary sys-
tem, the escape from epidemics may seem surpris-
ing. The experience of other bombed cities in
Germany and Japan shows that this is not an
isolated case. A possible explanation may lie
in the disinfecting action of the extensive fires. In
later weeks, disease rates rose, but not sharply.
3. Nagasaki.-Nagasaki is located on the best
natural harbor of western Kyushu, a spacious in-
let in the mountainous coast. The city is a highly
congested urqan pattern extending for several
miles along the narrow shores and up the valleys
opening out from the harbor. Two rivers, divided
by a mountain spur, form the two main valleys in
whose basins the city lies: the Urakami River, in
whose basin the atomic bomb fell, running into the
harbor from a NNW direction, and the Nakashima
River, running from the NE. This mountain spur
and the irregular layout of the city effectively
reduced the area of destruction.
The main residential and commercial districts
are intermingled in these two river basins. The
large industrial plants stretch up the west shore of
the bay and up the Urakami Valley. Though the
metropolitan area of the city is officially about 35
square miles and stretches far into the country-
side, the heavily built-up area is confined by the
terrain to less than 4 square miles. The greatest
9
population density thus approximated 65,000 per
square mile even after the evacuations.
Despite its excellent harbor, Nagasaki's com-
mercial importance, though great in previous ceu-
turie , had declined in recent years because of the
city's isolated peninsular position and the difficul-
ties of transportation through the mountains by
inadequate roads and raih'oad facilities. As a
naval base it had been supplanted by Sasebo. In-
dustry gradually increa ed in importance, pri-
marily under Mitsubishi influence. The four larg-
est companies in the city were the Mitsubishi Ship-
yards, Electrical Equipment Works, Arms Plant,
and Steel Works, employing nearly 90 percent of
the city's labor force. Administratively, Nagasaki
was by 1941 of merely local importance despite
being the seat of the prefectural government.
Before the atomic bombing on 9 August, Naga-
saki had experienced five small-scale air attacks
in the previous 12 months, by an aggregate of
136 planes which dropped a total of 270 tons of
high explosive, 53 tons of incendiary, and 20 tons
of fragmentation bombs.
Of these, a raid of 1 August 1945 was most effec-
tive, with several bombs falling in the Mitsubishi
Shipyards and Steel Works. The scale of effect
can be roughly measured, however, by comparing
the toll of building damage with that from the
atomic bomb; in all these raids 276 residential
buildings and 21 industrial buildings were de-
stroyed or badly damaged. When the atomic
bomb fell, Nagasaki was comparatively intact.
Because the most intense destruction was con-
fined to the Urakami VaHey, the impact of the
bomb on the city as a whole was less shattering
than at Hiroshima. In addition, no fire storm
occurred; indeed, a shift in wind direction helped
control the fires. Medical personnel and facilities
were hard-hit, however. Over 80 percent of the
city's hospital beds and the Medical College were
located within 3,000 feet of the center of the ex-
plosion, and were completely destroyed. Rein-
forced concrete buildings within this range, though
standing, were completely gutted by fire; build-
ings of wooden construction w-ere destroyed by
fire and blast. The mortality rate in this group
of buildings wa bet"een 75 and 0 percent. Ex-
act casualty figures for medical personnel are un-
known, but the city seems to have fared better
than Hiroshima: 120 doctors were at work on 1
November, about one-half of the preraid roster.
GROUND ZERO AT NAGASAKi-Before and after bombing.
A. A. F. Photos.
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•Casualties were undoubtedly high: 600 out of 850
medical students at the Nagasaki Medical College
were killed and most of the others injured; and
of the 20 faculty members, 12 were killed and 4
others inj ured.
Utilities and services were again disrupted.
Both gas plants were destroyed, and the replace-
ment time was estimated at several months.
Though the basic water supply was not affected,
thousands of residential feeder-line breaks were
supplemented by eight breaks on a 14-inch main
line and four breaks where another main line
crossed a bridge. Electric power distribution
and transmission systems were effectively de-
stroyed in the area of heaviest destruction, but
power could be supplied to the other parts of the
city almost immediately.
Shipping was virtually unaffected. Trolley
service was halted both by the interruption in
power supply and by damage to street cars. Na-
gasaki is at the end of a railroad spur line. The
major damage was sustained by track and railroad
bridges. The rails buckled intermittently for a
distance of 5,000 to 7,500 feet from ground zero,
at points where burning debris set fire to wooden
cross ties. Three bridges were displaced; rails
were distorted and the tracks had to be completely
rebuilt. The railroad stations were completely
destroyed by blast and fire and the electric signal
system was severely damaged. Rolling stock was
slightly damaged, primarily by fire. Although the
damage to equipment was not extensive, it was
severe enough to curtail traffic for 48 hours, during
which time sufficient emergency repair work was
performed to permit resumption of limited traffic.
Control of relief measures was in the hands of
the prefecture. The sequence of'clearance and
repair activities illustrates the activities that were
carried on.
The city's repair facilities were completely dis-
organized by the atomic bomb, so that with the
single exception of shutting off water to the af-
fected areas no repairs were made to roads, bridges,
water mains, or transportation installations by city
forces. The prefecture took full responsibility for
such restoration as was accomplished, delegating
to the scattered city help the task of assisting in
relief of victims. There were only 3 survivors of
115 employees of the street car company, and late as
the middle of November 1945 no cars were running.
A week after the explosion, the water works offi-
cials made an effort to supply water to persons
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attempting to live in the bombed-out areas, but the
leakage was so great that the effort was abandoned.
It fell to the prefecture, therefore, to institute
recovery mea ures even in those streets normally
the responsibility of the city. Of the entire public
works construction group covering the Nagasaki
city area, onJy three members appeared for work
and a week was required to locate and notify other
survivors. On the morning of 10 August, police
rescue units and workers from the Kawaminami
shipbuilding works began the imperative task of
clearing the Omura-Naga aki pike, which was im-
passable for 8,000 feet. A path 6% feet wide was
cleared despite the inten e heat from smouldering
fires, and by 15 August had been widened to permit
two-way traffic. No trucks, only rakes and shovels,
were available for clearing the streets, which were
filled with tile, bricks, stone, corrugated iron, ma-
chinery, pIa tel', and stucco. Street areas affected
by blast and not by fire were littered with wood.
Throughout the devastated area, all wounded had
to be carried by stretcher, since no motor vehicles
were able to proceed through the clutterfod streets
for several days. The plan for debris removal
required clearance of a few streets leading to the
main highway; but there were frequent delays
caused by the heat of smouldering fires and by
calls for relief work. The debris was simply raked
and shoveled off the streets. By 20 August the
job was con idered complete. The streets were not
materially damaged by the bomb nor were the sur-
face or the abutments of the concrete bridges, but
many of the wooden bridges were totally or par-
tially destroyed by fire.
Under the circumstances-nre, flight of entire
families, destruction of official records, mass crema-
tion-identification of dead and the accurate count
of casualties was impossible. As at Hiroshima, the
season of the year made rapid dispo al of bodies
imperative, and mass cremation and mass burial
were resorted to in the days immediately after the
attack. Despite the absence of sanitary measures,
no epidemics broke out here. The dysentery rate
rose from 25 per 100,000 to 125 per 100,000. A
census taken on 1 November 1945 found a popula-
tion of 142,700 in the city.
At Nagasaki, the scale of destruction was greater
than at Hiroshima, though the actual area de-
stroyed was smaller because of the terrain and the
point of fall of the bomb. The Nagasaki Prefec-
tural Report describes vividly the impress of the
bomb on the city and its inhabitants:
RESIDENTIAL AREAS, NAGASAKI. Shielded by hills, one congested area sltl"vived (note
firebreak in tbe foreground).
Atlotber, 1,000 feet nortbeast of ground zero was reduced to rubble.
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1Within a radius of 1 kilometer from ground zero, men
and animal died almost instantaneously from the tre-
mendous blast pressure and hea t; houses and other struc-
tures were smashed, crushed and scattered; and fires
broke out. The strong complex steel members of the
structures of the Mitsubishi Steel Works were bent and
twisted like jelly and the roofs of the reinforced con-
crete National Schools were crumpled and' collapsed,
indicating a force beyond imagination. Trees of all
sizes lost their branches or were uprooted or broken off
at the trunk.
Outside a radius of 1 kilometer and within a radius of
2 kilometers from ground zero, orne men and animals died
instantl~· from the great blast and heat, but the great
majority were seriously or 'uperficially injured. Houses
and other structures were completely destroyed while
fires broke out everywhere. Trees were uprooted and
withered by the heat.
Outside a raclius of 2 kilometers and within a radius
of 4 kilometers from ground zero, men and animals suf-
fered variou degrees of injury from window glass and
other fragments scattered about by the blast and many
were burned by the intense heat. Dwelling and other
structures were half damagecl by blast.
Outside a radius of 4 kilometers and within a radius
of 8 kilometers from the ground zero, living creatures were
injured by materials blown about by the blast; the ma-
jority were only superficially wounded. Houses were half
or only partially damaged.
While the conflagration with its uniformly
burnt-out area caught the attention at Hiroshima,
the blast effects, with their resemblance to the
aftermath of a hurricane, were most striking at
Nagasaki. Concrete buildings had their sides fac-
ing the blast stove in like boxes. Long lines of
steel-framed factory sheds, over a mile from
ground zero, leaned their skeletons away from the
explosion. Blast resistant obj ects such as tele-
phone poles leaned away from the center of the
explosion; on the surrounding hills trees were
blown down within considerable areas. Although
there was no general conflagration, fires contrib-
uted to the total damage in nearly all concrete
structures. Evidence of primary fire is more fre-
quent than at Hiroshima.
Becau e parts of the city were protected by
hills, more than one-half of the residential units
escaped serious damage. Of the 52,000 residential
units in the city on 1 August, 14,146 or 27.2 per-
cent were completely destroyed (by Japanese
count) (11,494 of these were burned); 5,441 or
10.5 percent were half-burned or destroyed; many
of the remaining units suffered superficial or minor
damage. In 558 nonresidential buildings in the
built-up area of Nagasaki which the Survey
studied, almost 60 percent of the usable floor area
13
was destroyed or structurally damaged. Oilly 12
percent was undamaged, the rest suffering super-
ficial or minor damage.
The survival of a higher percentage of the
buildings, then, distinguishes Nagasaki from Hiro-
shima, so also, on the other hand, does the damage
to factories. In Nagasaki, only the Mitsubishi
Dockyards among the major industries was re-
mote enough from the explosion to escape serious
damage. The other three Mitsubishi firms, which
were respon ible together with the dockyards for
over 90 percent of the industrial output of the city,
were seriously damaged. The Arms Plant and the
Steel Works "ere in the main area of damage.
Plant officials estimated that 58 percent of the
value of the former and 78 percent of the value
of the latter were destroyed: Survey investigators
considered the two plants to be 50 percent de-
stroyed. The Mitsubi hi Electric Works were on
the edge of the main area of destruction, but suf-
fered 10 percent structural damage.
One or two paragraphs from the report of the
commanding officer of Sasebo Naval District will
illustrate the sort of damage done to industrial in-
stallations. Of two plants of the Mitsubishi Arms
Works, he reports:
With the exception of the tunnel work hops and the
half-underground workshops, the Ohashi and Mori Machi
Plants were completely destroyed by collapse. Reinforced
concrete structures in these plants were severely damaged
internally-ceilings collapsed, fittings of all sorts were
destroyed, and equipment was damaged. Casting and
forging shops in the Oha hi Plant were destroyed by fire,
which broke out in those structures. The Mori Machi
Plant was nearly completely destroyed by fire. Taking
both plants together, 60 percent of the machinery installa-
tions was damaged. In the Ohashi Plant, from 80 to 90
percent of the machinery can be used again; in the Mori
Machi Plant only 40 to 50 percent of the machinery can
be used in the fu ture.
Or of the Mitsubishi Steel Works:
Plant structures here (some north-light steel framed
structures) suffered exten ive damage to roof and walls
as steel plates were blown off. The frames themselves
were bent, twisted, or toppled over, and several buildings
caught fire. Hardly any of the machinery in the plant
can be used again in its present condition. However,
nearly 70 percent of the machinery can be repaired.
In general, (as has proved true with high ex-
plosive or incendiary bombs also) the damage to
machinery and other contents of a factory was less
than damage to the buildings. In a Idition, the
air burst of the atomic bomb meant that it acted
indirectly on machine tools and other building
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1contents. Though a few tools were blown over by
blast, almost all the serious damage was caused by
debris from damaged building, overturning
through mass movement of buildings, or burning
of buildings.
Thus the extent and sort of damage to machinery
depended on the construction of the buildings
housing them. In wood-frame buildings, 95 per-
cent of the machines were seriously damaged, but
in reinforced concrete or steel framed buildings
only one-third or one-fourth of the machines were
affected seriously. As would be expected, fire
caused much damage to machines in timber framed
shops (practically all of which were destroyed up
to 7,000 feet from ground zero) and some damage
in other types of structure. Debris was a major
cause of damage only in certain reinforced con-
crete buildings, where walls and roofs collapsed.
Shortage of raw materials had reduced opera-
tions at these four Mitsubishi plants to a fraction
of their capacity. Had the raw material situation
been normal and had the war continued, it is esti-
mated that restoration of production would have
been po ible though slow. The dockyard, which
was affected mainly by the 1 August attack rather
than by the atomic bomb, would have been able
to produce at 80 percent of full capacity within
3 or 4 months. The steel works would have re-
quired a year to get into substantial production,
the electric works could have resumed production
at a reduced rate within 2 months and been back
at capacity within 6 months, and the arms plant
would have required 15 months to reach two-thirds
of their former capacity.
B. GENERAL EFFECTS
1. Oasualties.-The most striking result of the
atomic bombs was the great number of casualties.
The exact number of dead and injured will never
be known because of the confusion after the ex-
plosions. Persons unaccounted for might have
been burned beyond recognition in the falling
buildings, disposed of in one of the mass crema-
tions of the first week of recovery, or driven out
of the city to die or recover without any record
remaining. No sure count of even the preraid
populations existed. Because of the decline in
activity in the two port cities, the constant threat
of incendiary raids, and the formal evacuation
programs of the Government, an unknown number
of the inhabitants had either drifted away from
the cities or been removed according to plan. In
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this uncertain situation, estimates of casualties
have generally ranged between 100,000 and 180,000
for Hiro hima, and between 50,000 and 100,000 for
Nagasaki. The Survey believes the dead at Hiro-
shima to have been between 70,000 and 80,000,
with an equal number injured; at Nagasaki over
35,000 dead and somewhat more than that injured
seems the most plausible estimate.
Most of the immediate casualties did not differ
from those caused by incendiary or high-explo-
sive raids. The outstanding difference was the
presence of radiation effects, which became un-
mistakable about a week after the bombing. At
the time of impact, however, the causes of death
and injury were flash burns, secondary effects of
blast and falling debris, and burns from blazing
buildings. No records are available that give the
relative importance of the various types of in-
jury, especially for tho e who died immediately
after the explosion. Indeed, many of these people
undoubtedly died several times over, theoretically,
since each was subjected to several injuries, any
one of 1vhich would have been fatal. The Hiro-
shima prefectural health department placed the
proportion of deaths from burDE (flash or flame)
at 60 percent, from falling debris at 30 percent,
and from other injuries at 10 percent; it is gener-
ally agreed that burns caused at least 50 percent
of the initial casualties. Ot those who died later,
an increasing proportion succumbed to radiation
effects.
The seriousness of these radiation effects may
be measured by the fact that 95 percent of the
traced survivors of the immediate explosion who
were within 3,000 feet suffered from radiation dis-
ease. Colonel Stafford 'Warren, in his testimony
before the Senate Committee on Atomic Energy,
estimated that radiation was responsible for 7
to 8 percent of the total deaths in the two cities.
Most medical investigators who pent orne time
in the areas feel that this estimate is 'far too low;
it is generally felt that no less than 15 to 20 per-
cent of the deaths were from radiation. In addi-
tion, there were an equal number who were casual-
ties but urvived, as well as uncounted thousands
who probably were affected by the gamma rays but
not enough to produce definite illness.
A plausible estimate of the importance of the
various causes of death would range as follows:
Fla h burns, 20 to 30 percent.
Other injurie , 50 to 60 percent.
Radiation sickness, 15 to 20 percent.
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•If we examine the nature of the casualties under
each group of causes we find familiar and un-
familiar effects.
Flash burl'ls.-The flash of the explosion, which
was extremely brief, emitted radiant heat travel-
ling at the speed of light. Flash burns thus fol-
lowed the explosion instantaneously. The fact
that relatively few victims suffered burns of the
eyeballs should not be interpreted as an indication
that the radiant heat followed the flash, or that
time was required to build up to maximum heat
intensity. The explanation is simply that the
structure of the eye is more resistant to heat than
is average human skin, and near ground zero the
recessed position of the eyeball offered protection
from the overhead explosion. Peak temperatures
lasted only momentarily.
Survivors in the two cities stated that people
who were in the open directly under the explosion
of the bomb were so severely burned that the skin
was charred dark brown or black and that they
died within a few minutes or hours.
Among the survivors, the burned areas of the
skin showed evidence of burns almost immediately
after the explosion. At first there was marked
redness, and other evidence of thermal burns ap-
peared within the next few minutes or hours, de-
pending on the degree of the burn. Uninfected
burns healed promptly without any unusual clini-
cal features, according to the Japanese physicians
who attended the cases. American medical ob-
servers noted only a tendency to formation of ex-
cess scar tissue, which could be satisfactorily ex-
plained as the result of malnutrition and the large
degree of secondary infection that complicated
healing of the burns. There wet:e also a few in-
stances of burns healing with contractures and
limitation of the mobility of certain joints, such
as the elbows or knees. In many instances, these
primary burns of minor nature were completely
healed before patients developed evidence of
radiation effects.
Because of the brief duration of the flash wave
and the shielding effects of almost any objects-
leaves and clothing as well as buildings-there
were many interesting cases of protection. The
radiant heat came in a direct line like lio'ht so,.., ,
that the area burned corresponded to this directed
exposure. Persons whose sides were toward the
explosion often showed definite burns of both sides
of the back "hile the hollow of the back escaped.
People in buildings or houses were apparently
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burned only if directly exposed through the win-
dows. The most striking instance was that of a
man writing before a window. His hands were
seriously burned but his exposed face and neck
suffered only slight burns due to the angle of entry
of the radiant heat through the window.
Flash burns were largely coniined to exposed
areas of the body, but on occasion would occur
through varying thiclmesses of clothing. Gener-
ally speaking, the thicker the clothing the more
likely it was to give complete protection against
flash burns. One woman was burned over the
shoulder except for aT-shaped area about one-
fourth inch in breadth; the T-shaped area corre-
sponded to an increased thickness of the clothing
from the seam of the garment. Other people were
burned through a single thickness of kimono but
were unscathed or only slightly affected under-
neath the lapel. In other instances, skin was
burned beneath tightly fitting clothing but was
unburned beneath loosely fitting portions. Fi-
nally, white or light colors reflected heat and
afforded some protection; people wearing black
or dark-colored clothing were more likely to be
burned.
Other injuries.-Because of the combination ()f
factors at the area near the center of the explosion,
the casualty effects of blast are hard to single out.
If it is remembered that even directly under the
explosion, people were several hundred feet away
from the air-burst, it will be easier to understand
why true blast effects were relatively rare. Only
toward the periphery of the affected zone was the
blast effect later.al and likely to throw people vio-
lently against buildings, ana at the periphery the
intensity of the blast had fallen off sharply. COlll-
lJaratively few instances were reported of arms or
legs being torn from the body by flying debris.
Another indication of the rarity of over-pressure is
the scarcity of ruptured eardrums.. Among 106
victims examined by the Japanese in Hiroshima on
11 and 12 August, only three showed ruptured ear-
drums; a study done in October at the Omura hos-
pital near Nagasaki revealed that only two of 92
cases had ruptured eardrums. Only at Nagasaki
were there reports of over-pressure in the shock
wave. Some of the dead were said by survivors to
have had their abdomens ruptured and intestines
protruding; others were reported to have protrud-
ing eyes and tongues, and to have looked as if they
had drowned. Thorough check by Allied investi-
gators discredited these stories as evidence of di-
rect blast effects; the normal effects of blast are
internal hemorrhage and crushing. These exter-
nal signs point to injuries from debris rather than
blast.
Injuries produced by falling and flying debris
were much more numerous, and naturally increased
in number and seriousness nearer the center of the
affected area. The collapse of the buildings was
sudden, so that thousands of people were pinned
beneath the aebris. Many were able to extricate
themselves or received aid in escaping, but large
numbers succumbed either to their injuries or to
fire before they could be extricated. The flimsiness
of Japanese residental construction should not be
allowed to ohscure the dangers of collapse; though
the walls and partitions were light; the houses had
heavy roof timbers and heavy roof tiles. Flying
glass from panels also caused a large number of
casualties, even up to 15,000 feet from ground zero.
The number of burns :from secondary fires was
slight among survivors, but it was probable that a
large number of the deaths in both cities came
from the burning of people caught in buildings.
Eyewitness accounts agree that many fatalities
occurred in this way, either immediately or as a
result of the lack of care for those who did extricate
themselves with serious burns. There are no ref-
erences, hpwever, to people in the streets suc-
cumbing either to heat or to carbon monoxide as
they did in Tokyo or in Hamburg, Germany. A
few burns resulted from clothing set afire by the
flash wave, but in most cases people were able to
beat out such fires without serious injury to the
skin.
Radiation disease.-The radiation effects upon
survivors resulted from the gamma rays liberated
by the fission process rather than from induced
radio-activity or the lingering radio-activity of
deposits of primary fission products. Both at
Nagasaki and at Hiroshima, pockets of radio-ac-
tivity have been detected where fission products
were directly deposited, but the degree of activity
in these areas was insufficient to produce casualties.
Similarly, induced radio-activity from the inter-
action of neutrons with matter caused no authenti-
cated fatalities. But the effects of gamma rays-
here used in a general sense to include all pene-
trating high-frequency radiations and neutrons
that caused injury-are well established, even
though the Allies had no observers in the affected
areas for several weeks after the explosions.
Our understanding of radiation casualties is not
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complete. In part the deficiency is in our basic
knowledge of how radiation affects animal tissue.
In the words of Dr. Robert Stone of the Man-
hattan Project, "The fundamental mechanism of
the action of radiation on living tissues has not
been understood. All methods of treatment have
therefore been symptomatic rather than specific.
For this reason, studies into the fundamental
nature of the action of radiation have been carried
on to some extent, the limitation being that it was
unlikely that significant results could be obtained
during the period of war."
According to the Japanese, those individuals
very near the center of the explosion but not af-
fected by flash burns or secondary injuries became
ill within 2 or 3 days. Bloody diarrhea followed,
and the victims expired, some within 2 to 3 days
after the onset and the majority within a week.
Autopsies showed remarkable changes in the blood
picture-almost complete absence of white blood
cells, and deterioration of bone marrow. Mucous
membranes of the throat, lungs, stomach, and the
intestines showed acute inflammation.
The majority of the radiation cases, who were
at greater distances, did not show severe symptoms
until 1 to 4 weeks after the explosion, though
many felt weak and listless on the following day.
After a day or two of mild nausea and vomiting,
the appetite improved and the person felt quite
well until symptoms reappeared at a later date.
In the opinion of some Japanese physicians, those
who rested or subjected themselves to less physi-
cal exertion showed a longer delay before the
onset of subsequent symptoms. The first signs
of recurrence were loss of appetite, lassitude, and
general discomfort. Inflammation of the gums,
mouth, and pharynx appeared next. Within 12
to 48 hours, fever became evident. In many in-
stances it reached only 100° Fahrenheit and re-
mained for only a few days. In other cases, the
temperature went as high as 104° or 106° Fahren-
heit. The degree of fever apparently had a direct
relation to the degree of exposure to radiation.
Once developed, the fever was usually well sus-
tained, and in those cases terminating fatally it
continued high until the end. If the fever sub-
sided, the patient usually showed a rapid disap-
pearance of other symptoms and soon regained his
feeling of good health. The other symptoms com-
monly seen were shortage of white corpuscles, loss
of hair, inflammation and gangrene of the gums,
inflammation of the mouth and pharynx, ulcera-
tion of the lower gastro-i~testinal tract, small livid
spots (petechiae) resulting from escape of blood
into the tissues of the kin or mucous membrane,
and larger hemorrhages of gums, nose and skin.
Loss of hair usually began about 2 weeks after
the bomb explosion, though in a few instances it is
reported to have begun as early a 4 to 5 days
afterward. The areas were involved in the fol-
lowing order of frequency with variations de-
pending on the degree of exposure: calp, arm-
pits, beard, pubic region, and eyebrows. Com-
plete baldne s was rare. Microscopic study of the
body areas involved has shown atrophy of the
hair folhcles. In those patients who survived after
2 months, however, the hair has commenced to re-
grow. An interesting but unconfirmed report has
it that loss of the hair was less marked in persons
with grey hair than in those with dark hair.
A decrease in the number of white blood cor-
puscles in the circulating blood appears to have
been a constant accompaniment of radiation dis-
ease, even existing in some milder case without
other radiation effects. The degree of leukopenia
was probably the most accurate index of the
amount of radiation a person received. The nor-
mal white blood count averages 5,000 to 7,000:
leukopenia is indicated by a count of 4,000 or less.
The white blood count in the more severe cases
ranged from 1,500 to 0, with almost entire disap-
pearance of the bone marrow.. The moderately
severe cases showed evidence of degeneration of
bone marrow arid total white blood counts of 1,500
to 3,000. The milder cases showed white blood
counts of 3,000 to 4,000 with more minor degen-
eration changes in the bone marrow. The changes
in the system for forming red bl'ood corpuscles
developed later, but were equally severe.
Radiation clearly affected reproduction, though
the extent has not been determined. Sterility has
been a common finding throughout Japan, espe-
cially under the conditions of the last 2 years,
but there are sign of an increase in the Hiroshima
and J agasaki areas to be attributed to the radia-
tion. Sperm counts done in Hiro hima under
American supervision revealed low sperm counts
or complete aspermia for as long as 3 months
afterward in males who were within 5,000 feet
of the center of the explosion. Cases dying of
radiation disease showed clear effects on sperma-
togenesis. Study of sections of ovaries from au-
topsied radiation victim has not yet been com-
pleteted. The effects of the bomb on pregnant wo-
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men are marked, however. Of women in various
stages of pregnancy who were within 3,000 feet
of ground zero, all known cases have had mis-
carriages. Even up to 6,500 feet they have had
miscarriages or premature infants who died
shortly after birth. In the group between 6,500
and 10,000 feet, about one-third have given birth
to apparently normal children. Two months after
the explosion, the city's total incidence of mi -
carriage , abortion , and premature births was
27 percent as compared with a normal rate of 6
percent. Since other factors than radiation con-
tributed to this increased rate, a period of years
will be required to learn the ultimate effects of
mass radiation upon reproduction.
Treatment of victims by the Japanese was lim-
ited by the lack of medical supplie and facilitie .
Their therapy consisted of small amounts of vita-
mins, liver extract, and an occasional blood trans-
fusion. Allied doctors used penicillin and plasma
with beneficial effects. Liver extract seemed to
benefit the few patients on whom it was used: It
was given in small frequent doses when available.
A large percentage of the cases died of secondary
disease, such as septic bronchopneumonia or tuber-
culosis, as a result of lowered resistance. Deaths
from radiation began about a week after exposure
and reached a peak in 3 to 4 weeks. They had
practically ceased to occur after 7 to 8 weeks.
Unfortunately, no exact definition of the kill-
ing power of radiation can yet be given, nor a
satisfactory account of the sort and thickness of
concrete or earth that will shield people. From
the definitive report of the Joint Commission will
come more nearly accurate statements on these
matters. In the meanwhile the awesome lethal
effects of the atomic bomb and the insidious addi-
tional peril of the gamma rays speak for them-
selves.
There is reason to believe that if the effects of
blast and fire had been entirely absent from the
bombing, the number of deaths among people
within a radius of one-half mile from ground zero
would have been almost as great as the actual
figures and the deaths among those within 1 mile
would have been only slightly less. The principal
difference would have been in the time of the
deaths. Instead of being killed outright as were
most of these victims, they would have survived
for a few days or even 3 or 4 weeks, only to die
eventually of radiation disease.
The e suppositions have vital importance, for
actually in Nagasaki and Hiroshima many people
who were protected by structures against blast
and fire were not protected against the effect of
gamma rays. The complexity of the problem of
shelter protection has been increased by this ne-
cessity of shielding against radiant heat and
gamma rays. Fortunately, earth and concrete will
shield against gamma rays, the required thickness
\Urying with the intensity of the rays.
The slow and inadequate treatment of victims
by the Japanese probably contributed to the high
casualty rates. Many person could undoubtedly
have been saved had facilitie , supplies, and per-
sonnel been available immediately after the bomb-
ings. Probably the number of deaths from the
true bla t effect, flame burns, or serious injuries
from collapsing structures would not have been
altered appreciably; generally speaking, these
ca es either were killed outright or e1 e survived.
Many of the fla h burn cases could have been saved
with tremendous quantities of plasma and paren-
teral fluid if treatment could have begun within
a fe', hour after the bombing. Probably the most
significant results could have been achieved with
the radiation cases. With large quantities of whole
blood and adequate supportive treatment, possibly
10 to 20 percen t of those dying of radiation might
have sunived. However, it is doubtful that 10
percent of all the deaths resulting from the atomic
bombs could have been avoided with the best med-
ical care. A more likely figure is 5 to 8 percent.
2. Morale.2-As might be expected, the primary
reaction to the bomb was fear-uncontrolled terror,
trengthened by the sheer horror of the destruc-
tion and suffering witne sed and experienced by
the survivors. Between one-half and two-thirds
of those intervie,yed in the Hiroshima and Naaa-
. 0
saki areas confessed having such reactions, not just
for the moment but for some time. As two sur-
vivors. put it:
Whenever a plane was seen after that, people would
I'ush into their shelters: They went in and out so much
that they did not have time to eat. They were so ner·vous
they could not work.
After the atomic bomb fell, I just couldn't stay home. I
would cook, but while cooking I would always be watching
out and worrying whether an atomic bomb would fall
near me.
The behavior of the living immediately after the
'An U. S. S. B. s. Morale rlh·i.ion team inter'riewerl a scien-
tifically selected sample of almost 250 persons: 128 from Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki cities, and] 20 from thE' immediately sur-
rounding are.as: The same. standard Questions were put to these
people and lmllar groups 10 representative Japane e cities.
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bombings, as described earlier, clearly shows the
state of shock that hindered rescue efforts. A
Nagasaki survivor illustrates succinctly the mood
of survivors:
All I aw was a flash and I felt my body get warm and
then I saw eYerything flying around. :My grandmother
wa hit on the head by a flying piece of roof and she was
bleeding * * * I became hysterical seeing my grand-
mother bleeding and we just ran around without knowing
what to do.
I was working at the office. I was talking to a friend
at the window. I saw the whole city in a red flame, t)len
I ducked. The pieces of the gla s hit my back and face.
My dress was torn off by the glass. Then I got up and
ran to the mountain where the good shelter was.
The two typical impulses were those: Aimless,
even hysterical activity or flight from the city to
shelter and food. .
The accentuated effect of these bombs came not
only from the.surpri e and their cru hing power,
but also from the feeling of security among the
inhabitants of the two cities before the attacks.
Though agasaki had undergone five raids in the
previou year, they had not been heavy, and Hiro-
shima had gone almost untouched until the morn-
ing of 6 August 1945. In both cities many people
felt that they would be pared, and the variou
rumors in circulation supporting such feelina
. b
covered a WIde range of wishful thoughts. There
were so many Chri tians there, many Japanese-
Americans came from Hiroshima, the city was a
famous beauty spot-these and other even more
fantastic reasons encouraged hopes. Other people
felt vaguely that their city was being saved for
"something big," however.
Such a shattering event could not fail to have
its impact on people's ways of thinking. Study
of the pattern of belief about the war, before and
aft.er the bombing, show this change clearly.
PrlOr to the dropping of the atomic bombs the
people of the two target cities appear to hav~ had
fewer ~~sgivings about the war than people in
other cibes. Response to set questions indicate
that among J apane e civilians prior to 1 J ulv
]945: .
59 percent in the Hiroshima-Naga aki areas
but
74 percent in the other urban areas entertained
doubts about a Japanese Victory;
31 percent in Hiroshima-Nagasaki but
47 percent in other urban areas felt certain
that victory for Japan was impo sible;
12 percent in Hiroshima- J agasaki but
,
r
3± percent in other urban areas had reached a
point where they felt unable to continue the
war.
Further,
2 percent of the people of Japan as a whole
aid they had never reached a point where
they felt they could not go on with the war,
\,hereas
39 percent of the people in the Hiroshima-
~ agasaki areas said they had never reached
such a point.
These figures clearly suggest that the will to resist
had indeed been higher in the "atomic bomb cit-
ies" than in Japan as a whole.
There is no doubt that the bomb was the most
important influence among the people of these
areas in making them think that defeat was in-
evitable. An additional 28 percent stated that
after the atomic bomb was dropped they became
convinced that victory for Japan wa impossible.
Almost one-fourth admitted that because of the
bombing they felt personally unable to carryon.
Forty percent testified to various degrees of de-
featism induced by the atomic bomb. Signifi-
cantly, certainty of defeat was much more preva-
lent at Hiroshima, where the area of devastation
and the ca ualties were greater, than at Nagasaki.
Typical comments of survivors were:
If the enemy has this type of bomb, everyone is going
to die, and we wish the war would hurry and finish.
I did not expect that it was that powerful. I thought
we have no defense against uch a bomb.
Qne of my children was killed by it, and I didn't care
what happened after that.
Other reactions were found. II) view of their
experiences, it is not remarkable that some of the
survivors (nearly one-fifth) hated the Americans
for using the bomb or expressed their anger in
such terms as "cruel," "inhuman," and "barbarous."
* * * they really despise the Americans for it, the
people all say that if there are such things as ghosts, why
don't they haunt the American ?
When I saw the injured and killed, I felt bitter against
the emeny.
After the atomic bomb e:-''Ploded, I felt that now I must
go to work in a munitions plant * * *. My son told
me that they wouldn't forget the atomic bomb even when
they grow up.
The reaction of hate and anger is not surprising,
and it is ukely that in fact it was a more extensive
sentiment than the figures indicate, since unques-
tionably many respondents, out of fear or polite-
ness, did not reveal their sentiments with complete
candor. Despite this factor, the frequency of hos-
tile sentiments seems low. Two percent of the
respondent even volunteered the observation that
they did not blame the United States for u ing the
bomb. There is evidence that some hostility was
turned against their own Government, either be-
fore or after the surrender, although only a few
said they wondered why their nation could not
have made the bomb. In many instances the re-
action was simply one of resignation. A common
comment was, "Since it was war, it was just
shikata-ga-nai (Too bad)."
Admiration for the bomb was more frequently
expressed than anger. Over one-fourth of the
people in the target cities and surrounding area
said they were impressed by its power and by the
scientific skill which underlay its discovery and
production.
Of greater significance are the reactions of the
Japanese people as a whole. The two raids were
all-Japan events and were intended so : The Allied
Powers were trying to break the figh ting spirit of
the Japanese people and their leaders, not just of
the re idents of Hiroshima and J agasaki. Vir-
tually all the Japanese people had a chance to
react to the bomb though the news had not
reached to full spread at the time of the surrender.
By the time the interviewing was done, only about
2 percent of the population in rural areas and 1
percent in the cities had not heard of the bomb.
The reactions found in the bombed cities ap-
peared in the country as a whole-fear and terror,
anger and hatred against the users, admiration for
the scientific achievementr-though in each case
with less intensity. The effect of the bomb on
attitudes toward the war in Japan as a whole was,
however, much less marked than in the target
cities. While 40 percent of the latter responqents
reported defeatist feelings induced J:?y the bomb,
28 percent of those in the islands as a whole at-
tributed such reactions to the news of the bomb.
There are at least three pos ible explanations of
this difference. First, the level of confidence was
quite low in Japan well before the time of the
atomic bombing. Prior to 1 July 19±5 doubts
about a Japanese victory were felt by 74 percent
of the population. By the ame data 47 percent
had become certain that a Japanese victory was
impossible, and 34 percent felt that they could not
go on with the "ar. nder these circumstances,
the announcement of a new and devastating
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weapon was merely an addition to the already
eloquent evidence of national weakness. Second,
the reaction of those at some distance from the
target cities seems to have been blunted by their
direct experience with other sorts of misfortunes
and hardships, the common phenomenon of psycho-
logical di tance increasing with geographical dis-
tance. In Japan as a whole, for example, military
losses and failures, such as those at Saipan, the
Philippines, and Okinawa, were twice as impor-
tant as this atomic bomb in inducing certainty
of defeat. Other raids over Japan as a whole were
more than three times as important in this re-
spect. Consumer deprivations, such as food short-
ages and the attendant malnutrition, were also
more important in bringing people to the point
where they felt they could not go on with the war.
Third, the lack of understanding of the mean-
ing of the new weapon in areas away from the
target undoubtedly limited its demoralizing effect.
As distance from the target cities increased, the
effectiveness of the bombs in causing certainty of
defeat declined progressively:
Percent oj popltlation cer-
Group of cities: tain oj dejeat because
oj atomic bombBiro bima - agasaki -- nn 25
Cities nearest to target cities n __n_n____ 23
Cities near to target cities n nn
n
15
Cities far from target citie . __h__________ 8
Cities farthest from target cities__n________ 6
Only in the nearest group of cities, within 40
miles of Hiroshima or J agasaki, was there a sub-
stantial effect on morale. Were the channels of
mass communication as readily available to all
the population as they are in the United States
and had the use of the bomb received anything
like the intensive coverage it had here, the effect
on continued support of the war would probably
have been greater. Something approaching such
knowledge, of course, probably would have spread
rather widely had the war continued many more
weeks, whether sanctioned by the censors or
spread by the ever-active rumor channels so com-
mon in the country.
It i apparent that the effect of the atomic bomb-
ings on the confidence of the Japanese civilian
population was remarkably localized. Outside of
the target cities, it "as subordinate to other de-
moralizing experiences. The effect which it did
have was probably due largely to the number of
casualties and ~he nature of the injuries received.
These consequences were in part the result of
surprise and the vulnerability of the raid defense
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system. Properly enforced warnings, precau-
tions and an emergency care organization of the
scale of the bomb's effects might have reduced
ca ualties and, therefore, the effects on morale.
Even in the target cities, it must be emphasized,
the atomic bombs did not uniformly destroy the
Japanese fighting spirit. Hiroshima and :N aga-
saki, when compared with other Japanese cities,
"ere not more defeatist than the average. The
bombs were tremendous personal catastrophes to
the survivors, but neither time nor understanding
of the revolutionary threat of the atomic bomb
permitted them to see in these personal catastro-
phes a final blow to Japan's prospects for victory
or negotiated peace.
3. The Japanese decision to 8'ttrrender.-The
further question of the effects of the bombs on the
morale of the Japanese leaders and their decision
to abandon tl:e war is tied up with other factors.
The atomic bomb had more effect on the thinking
of Government leaders than on the morale of the
rank and file of civilians outside of the target
areas. It cannot be said, however, that the atomic
bomb convinced the leaders who effected the peace
of the necessity of surrender. The decision to seek
ways and means to terminate the "aI', influenced
in part by Imowledge of the low state of popular
morale, had been taken in May 19"*5 by the Su-
preme War Guidance CounciL
As early as the spring of 19M, a group of for-
mer prime ministers and others close to the Em-
peror had been making efforts toward bringing the
war to an end. This group, including such men as
Admiral Okada, Admiral Yonai, Prince Konoye,
and Marquis Kido, had been influential in effecting
Tojo's resignation and in making Admiral Suzuki
Prime Minister after Koiso's falL Even in the
Suzuki cabinet, however, agreement was far from
unanimous. The Navy Minister, Admiral Yonai, .
was sympathetic, but the War Minister, General
Anami, usually represented the fight-to-the-end
policy of the Army. In the Supreme War Guid-
ance Council, a sort of inner cabinet, his adherence
to that line was fUl'ther assured by the participa-
tion of the Army and Navy chiefs of staff, so that
on the peace issue thi organization was evenJy
divided, with these three opposing the Prime Min-
ister, Foreign Minister, and Navy Minister. At
any time military (especially Army) dissatis-
faction with the Cabinet might have eventuated at
least in its fall and pos ibly in the "liquidation" of
the antiwar members.
1
Thus the problem facing the peace leaders in the
Government was to bring about a surrender despite
the hesitation of the War Minister and the opposi-
tion of the Army and Navy chiefs of staff. This
had to be done, moreover, without precipitating
counter measures by the Army which would elimi-
nate the entire peace group. This was done ulti-
mately by bringing the Emperor actively into the
decision to accept the Pot dam terms. So long as
the Emperor openly supported such a policy and
could be presented to the country as doing so, the
military, which had fostered and lived on the idea
of complete obedience to the Emperor, could not
effectively rebeL
A preliminary step in this direction had been
taken at the Imperial Conference on 26 June. At
this meeting, the Emperor, taking an active part
despite his custom to the contrary, stated that he
desired the development of a plan to end the war as
well as one to defend the home islands. This was
followed by a renewal of earlier efforts to get the
Soviet Union to intercede with the United States,
which were effectively answered by the Potsdam
Declaration on 26 July and the Russian declara-
tion of war on 9 August.
The atomic bombings considerably speeded up
these political maneuverings within the govern-
ment. This in itself was partly a morale effect,
since there is ample evidence that members of the
Cabinet were worried by the prospect of further
atomic bombings, especially on the remains of
Tokyo. The bombs did not convince the military
that defen e of the home islands was impossible, i.i
their behavior in Government councils is adequate
te timony. It did permit the Government to say,
however, that no army without the weapon could
possibly resist an enemy who had it, thus saving
"face" for the Army leaders and not reflecting on
the competence of J apane e industrialists or the
valor of the Japanese soldier. In the Supreme
War Guidance Council voting remained divided,
with the war minister and the two chiefs of staff
unwilling to accept unconditional surrender.
There seems little doubt, however, that the bomb-
ing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ,veakened their
inclination to oppose the peace group.
The peace effort culminated in an Imperial con-
ference held on the night of 9 August and con-
tinued into the early hours of 10 August, for which
the stage was set by the atomic bomb and the Rus-
sian war declaration. At this meeting the Em-
peror, again breaking his customary silence, stated
specifically that he wanted acceptance of the
Potsdam terms.
A quip was current in high Government circles
at this time that the atomic bomb was the real
Kamikaze, since it saved Japan from further use-
less slaughter and destruction. It is ap arent
that in the atomic bomb the Japanese found the
opportunity which they had been seeking, to break
the existing deadlock within the Government over
acceptance of the Potsdam terms.
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III. HOW THE ATOMIC BOMB WORKS
Out of the stories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
can be built up, detail by detail, the picture of
how the atomic bomb works-the different forms
of energy given off, the velocity and intensity of
each, the sort of effects each has on animate and
inanimate objects. In these factors is the real
story of what happened at Hiroshima and Naga-
saki, for in them chance circumstances are ruled
out.
Spectators' accounts, whether of the New Mex-
ico, the Hiroshima, or the Nagasaki explosion, de-
scribe similar pictures. At Nagasaki, for example,
the bomb exploded at 1102 with a tremendous flash
of blue-white light, like a giant magnesium f1.are.
The flash was accompanied by a rush of heat and
\Va followed by a huge pressure wave and the
rumbling sound of the explosion. Curiously
enough, this sound was not distinctly noted by
tho e who survived near the center of the explo-
sion, although it wa heard as far as 15 miles away.
People on the hillsides in the country at a con-
siderable distance from Nagasaki told of seeing
the blue-white and then multicolored flash over
the city, followed some seconds later by a tre-
mendous clap, like thunder very close overhead.
A huge snow-white cloud shot rapidly into the
sky and the scene on the ground was obscured first
by a bluish haze and then by a purple-brown cloud
of dust and smoke.
The survivors were not aware at the time that
a radically new bomb had been used. They were
con cious of an explo ion of tremendous power,
but even the Government had no conception, until
President Truman's announcement was broadcast,
of the new principle of operation. If we strip our
minds of any lingering prejudice that the atomic
bomb is supernatural or incomprehensible in its
operation, we shall see why its uniqueness was not
at first recognized.
A. THE NATURE OF THE EXPLOSION
The atomic bomb work by explosion. An ex-
plosion is, in the word of the Smyth report, sim-
ply a "sudden and violent release of a large amount
of energy in a small region." As do ordinary high
explosives, atomic bomb release energy, though
on an unprecedented scale. The energy takes three
forms (one of which is new), and all the effects
of the bomb can be referred directly to these three
kinds of energy. They are:
(1) Heat (which is present in other explosions,
as the familiar injuries known as "f1.ash burns"
on warships illustrate, but ordinarily not at high
enough diffused temperatures to burn a man or
set fire to combustible objects at any considerable
distance from the explosion).
(2) Radiation (similar to X-rays or to that
from radium).
(3) Blast or pressure (as from a demolition
bomb).
The whole discussion of the effects of the atomic
bomb will be phrased in terms of these three kind
of energy. No other more my terious or immeas-
urable forces acted; these were all.
These were enough. The energy released in
atomic explosion is of such magnitude and from
so concentrated a source that it sets entirely new
problems in its use or in protection against it.
Ordinary burning or explosion is a chemical re-
action in which energy is released during the re-
arrangement of the atoms of the explosive ma-
terial. In an atomic reaction, however, the iden-
tity of the atoms, not simply their arrangement, is
changed. The change is more fundamental: in it,
matter is transformed into energy. The energy
released when a pound of nitroglycerine explodes
would, when converted into heat, raise the tem-
pera ture of 150 pounds of water by 18° F. The
explosion of a pound of uranium would produce
an equal temperature rise in 2 billion pounds of
water! Clearly, only a small part of. the ma sin
the bomb's active core need be transformed to
give an explosion of tremendou power.
At the time of the explosion, then, energy was
given off in the forms of light, heat, gamma ra-
diation, and pressure. The whole range of radia-
tions, indeed, seems to have been present. There
were heat radiations in the low frequency band
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below infrared, visible waves of all colors (as the
eyewitness accounts show), and penetrating ra-
diations of very high frequency generally grouped
as "gamma rays." Light and radiant heat ("flash
heat") sped out in all directions at a rate of 186,000
miles per second, and the gamma rays at the same
rate (though their effect was not immediately
obvious). The shock waves travelled much more
slowly. It may be inferred fronl tests with high
explosives that the rate aL a relative short distance
from the point of explosion was about 2 miles per
second, and dropped rapidly to the speed of sound,
or about one-fifth of a mile per second. Thus the
light, heat, and gamma radiation reached the tar-
get first, followed by shock and sound and the
high winds of the blast.
B. HEAT
The center of the explosions-several hundred
feet above ground-was a ball of fire. Because
the radiant heat gi ven off at the explosion easily
charred combustible objects while ceasing so
quickly th at surfaces not in the direct 'line of ra-
diation were unaffected, there are clearly marked
"shadows" visible where objects were shielded
against the heat. By projecting back the sharply
nefined outlines of these shadows, Japanese and
AllieJ scientists have determined the height and
diameter of the fireball. The two fireballs were
apparently several hundred feet in diameter. The
temperature at their core was virtually inconceiv-
able-millions of degrees centigrade. Even at its
edge, the temperature was several thousand de-
grees; reasoning from the heat effects observed
on human beings, bubbled roof tile, and combust-
ible materials, Japanese and Alli.ed scientists have
placed the figure variously between 3,000° and
9,000° C. Energy given off in heat alone was es-
timated by Japanese physicists at the astronomical
figure of 1013 calories.
The flash heat was intense enough to cause fires,
despite the distance of the fi.reball from the ground.
Clothing ignited, though it could be quickly beaten
out, telephone poles charred, thatched roofs of
houses caught fire. In Hiroshima, the explosion
started hundreds of fires almost simultaneously,
the most distant of which was found 13,700 feet
from ground zero; this, however, probably started.
when a building with a thatched roof collapsed
onto a hot charcoal fire. Fires were started di-
rectly by flash heat in such easily ignitible sub-
stances as dark cloth, paper, or dry-rotted wood,
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within about 3,500 feet of ground zero; white-
painted, concrete-faced or cement-stuccoed struc-
tures reflected the heat and did not ignite. A cedar
bark roof and the top of a dry-rotted wooden plat-
form 5,200 feet west of ground zero, were reported
to have been ignited by the bomb flash. The ma-
jority of initial fires in buildings, however, were
started by secondary sources (kitchen charcoal
fires, electric short-circuits, industrial process fires,
etc.) . In Nagasaki, both Japanese and American
fire experts agreed that more fires were caused di-
rectly than indirectly, in a ratio of 60 to 40. The
range of primary fire there is reported to have
exceeded 10,000 feet.
Charred telephone poles were discernible for
10,000 feet south and 13,000 feet north of ground
zero at Hiroshima, and for 13,000 feet or more at
Nagasaki. Bubbling of roof tile occurred at Hiro-
shima from ground zero out to 4,000 feet, though
with only scattered frequency after 2,000 feet.
The same phenomenon was reported at Nagasaki,
accompanied again by scarring and peeling of
granitic rocks, almost a mile from ground zero.
A similar bubbled surface was obtained at the Na-
tional Bureau of Standards by heating a sample of
the tile to 1,800° C. for a period of 4 seconds. The
effect so produced extended deeper into the tile than
did the bubbling caused by the atomic bomb, which
indicates that the explosion of the bomb subjected
the tile to a temperature of more than 1,800°
for less than 4 seconds.
Persons reported feeling heat on their skin as
far away as 24,000 feet. Burns of unprotected skin
certainly occurred up to 12,000 to 13,000 feet, and
reportedly up to 15,000 feet-nearly 3 miles. Seri-
ous or third-degree burns were suffered by those
directly exposed within 4,500 feet, and occasionally
as remote as 7,200 feet. In the immediate area of
ground zero, the heat charred corpses beyond
recognition.
Clothing as well as buildings afforded consid-
erable protection against the flash. Even a clump
of grass or tree leaf was, on occasion, adequate.
The implication dearly is that the duration of
the flash was less than the time required for the
grass or leaf to shrivel. While an accurate esti-
mate is not possible, the duration could hardly
have exceeded a fraction of a second.
C. RADIAnON
From the chain reaction which produced the
mass release of energy in the explosion, a wide
NAGASAKI-Blistet'ed tile found 'tit g"olmd zero.
"Shadow" of hand valve wheel on paint of a gas holder at Hiroshima. Radial~t heat instantly
burned paint where the heat rays were not obstt·ltcted. 6,300 feet from ground zero
(Japanese photo).
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NEW' SHOOTS are appearing on this limb of a chestmtt tree,
about 2,100 feet south of ground zero at agasaki, 2 months
after the attack, evetz though the leaves were burned and
withered at the time of the explosion (Japanese photo),
TERED BY BLAST on a Nagasaki hillside,
photo).
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range of radiation were released. The light and
heat are familiar elements of explosions, but the
free neutron and high-frequency radiations such
as gamma rays are a new phenomenon. These
radiations are highly penetrating and lethal.
The damaging penetration of radiation would
be possible from three sources:
(a) From the high-frequency radiations,
whether neutrons, gamma ray, or other unspeci-
fied rays, released in the chain reaction of the
bomb.
(b) From lingering radioactivity from de-
posits of primary fission products scattered in
the explosion.
(0) From induced radioactivity in the bombed
area, caused by interaction of neutrons with matter
penetrated.
Only the first cause seems to have had important
effects, though there are detectable pockets of
radioactivity in both cities. At Takasu, 10,000
feet from ground zero at Hiroshima, and at Nishi-
yama, 6,500 feet from ground zero in Nagasaki,
scientific measurements weeks after the explosion
showed radioactivity. Presumably this was from
depo its of primary fi ion products rather than
induced radioactivity. In tests of the ground and
bones of victims of radiation di ease, certain sub-
tances-phosphorus, barium, strontium, rare
earth&--have shown radioactivity. Though evi-
dence of lingering radioactivity i slight, it i
strong enough to leave open the ominous possi-
bility of a different situation had the bomb ex-
ploded at ground level.
The radiation apparently had no lasting effects
on the soil or vegetation: Seeds later planted
within a few hundred feet of ground zero grew
normally. Examination of subsurface soil in the
immediate area showed presence of earthworms
and other life only a few inches below the surface.
The effect on human procreation is as yet unde-
termined, but pregnant women within a mile of
ground zero showed an increased number of mis-
carriage , and there wa in most case a low sperm
count among men in the same area. Stories of
harmful effects on people \yho came into the area
after the explosion have been di proved by investi-
gation.
The rays proved lethal for an average radius
of 3,000 feet from ground zero. They caused loss
of hair up to 7,500 feet and occasionally beyond,
and other mild effects up to almost 2 miles.
D. BLAST
The pressure or shock wave travelled out in
all directions from the explosion. The blast ef-
fects produced were uniform, and e sentially those
of conventional large high-explosive weapon
though on a much larger cale. Thus, illstead of
localized effects such as the collapse of a roof truss
or wall panel, entire buildings were crushed or
distorted as units.
The blast pressure, as with high explosives, rose
almost instantaneously to a peak, declined more
slowly, and then fell below atmospheric pressure
for a period about three times the period during
which it was above atmospheric pressure. The
positive period-that during which the pressure
was greater than atmospheric-was of much
greater peak pressure than the succeeding, or neg-
ative phase. Short though the positive phase
was-probably.only slightly longer than a sec-
ond-it lasted longer than the positive phase of
ordinary bombs. Thus the effect of the atomic
bomb on buildings was usually that of a powerful
push which shoved buildings over or left them
leaning, whereas high explo ive bombs strike
sharply and much more briefly and tend to punch
holes in walls. The duration was also long
enough so that almost all building failures came
during the positive phase. Comparatively few
evidences were found of failures of members dur-
ing the longer but Ie s intense negative phase;
window shutters blown out~-ards toward the ex-
plo ion were very rare.
Experiments with high explosives have shown
that the face-on peak pressures are approximately
two to five times as intense as side-on peak pres-
sures; thus greater damage was inflicted on vmlls
or roofs facing the blast than on similar surfaces
parallel to the blast. Near ground zero, the blast
struck almost vertically downward. Buildings
were crushed if weak, or the roofs were crushed
in with little or no damage to the walls. Trunks
of trees remained standing, but stripped of their
branches; telephone poles, pushed farther out, also
remained erect near the center. lany small build-
ings were virtually engulfed in the pressure wave
and simultaneously crushed from different direc-
tions. At somewhat greater distances, both hori-
zontal and vertical components of the blast were
appreciable, and buildings suffered damage both
to roofs and to walls facing the explosion. At con-
siderable distances, where the blast was travelling
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BLAST STRUCK DO\l7N\l7ARD against the roof of the Chinzei School, 1,500 feet boom
ground zero at I agasaki, which had beetz taken over ilZ part f01' mtmitions wOl'k,
The fourth story collapsed completely, but the heavy earthquake-1'esistant stl'ucture
protected some machine tools on the first floor from seriottS damage, Electric trans-
fo·rmers and a switchboard did not escape; a combination of bit1St, fire, and debris
dest1'oyed them,
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/in an almost horizontal direction, damage was
predominantly inflicted on walls during the blast.
In such cases, the buildings were often completely
racked by the inability of roof truss members to
transmit the pressure to the far walls.
Shielding was more important at Nagasaki than
at Hiroshima, because of the hills that divided the
city. Building restrictions in Japan after the 1923
earthquake limited building height to 100 feet;
thu there was little shielding by buildings from
these airburst bombs.
Reflection and diffraction effects were observed.
Had the blast travelled in completely straight
lines, more buildings would have survived in Naga-
saki than actually did. Reflection effects were most
clearly observed in the destruction of parapet walls
of roofs on the side away from the bomb, where re-
flection of the blast wave from the roof reinforced
the blast impinging on the wall directly. They
were also yjsible in the displacing and cracking of
concrete decks of bridges within 1,000 feet of
ground zero, where reflection of the blast wave
from the water struck the bridges where their
resistance was least.
The resistance of buildings depended very
largely on their construction, as two examples
show.
(a) In the area betwen 2,000 and 3,000 feet from
ground zero at Nagasaki, only 9.5 percent of the
floor area of reinforced concrete buildings was
destroyed or structurally damaged. Yet in the
ring between 4,000 and 5,000 feet from ground zero,
56 percent of such buildings was destroyed or struc-
turally damaged. Careful examination showed
that the difference lay solely in design, construction
detail, and materials: The bomb detonated over
a section containing the most carefully and
strongly built buildings in the city, the majority
multistory earthquake resistant structures. This
strength more than compensated for the greater
intensity of blast. A rapidly diminishing blast
was capable of serious damage to weaker buildings
further away, mostly high, single-story industrial
buildings, with thin, shell-type arch roofs.
(b) At both cities, steel-framed buildings with
corrugated asbestos walls and roofs suffered less
structural damage than those with corrugated iron
or sheet-metal walls and roofs. The corrugated
asbestos crumbled easily, permitting the blast pres-
sure to equalize itself rapidly around the main
framing members, but the steel siding transferred
the pressure to the structural members, causing
distortion or general collapse.
The limits of blast effects extended 8 miles out,
where some glass reportedly shattered in Hiro-
shima; at the same city, some roof stripping and
disturbance of tiles was inflicted at the Japan Steel
Co., 4.1 miles from ground zero.
In analyzing the extent of the destruction
wrought by the bombs, it i nece sary to discrimi-
nate between the two cities and between different
types of buildings. Equivalent effects are found
at Nagasaki over greater areas. Structural dam-
age to reinforced concrete buildings, both earth-
quake resistant and nonearthquake resistant, oc-
curred within an area of 0.05 square mile at Hiro-
shima, but at Nagasaki similar severe damage was
inflicted in an area of 0.43 square mile.
Severe damage to one-story light steel frame
buildings was equally extensive at the two cities;
the area was 3.3 'square miles at Nagasaki and 3.4
square miles at Hiroshima. Heavy steel frame
buildings could be studied only at Nagasaki,
where they suffered structural damage over an
area of 1.8 square miles.
One-story brick building with load bearing
walls were severely damaged "ithin an area of
8.1 square miles at :N agasaki, and within an area
of 6 square miles at Hiroshima. fultistory brick
buildings, which "ere studied only at Hiroshima,
were everely damaged within an area of 3.6 square
miles.
vVood domestic buildings were severely damaged
within an area of 7.5 square miles at Nagasaki,
and within an area of 6 square miles at Hiroshima.
Wood frame industrial and commercial buildings,
which were of inferior construction, were severely
damaged within 9.9 square miles at Nagasaki, and
8.5 square miles at Hiroshima.
Maximum blast pressures fall off very rapidly as
the distance from the detonation increases. In
the two bombed cities, thus, reinforced concrete
buildings of good construction were structurally
damaged only when within a few hundred feet of
ground zero. Indeed, ground zero itself was too
di tant from air zero for the earthquake-resistant
buildings to be collapsed. It is the opinion of the
Survey's engineers that at Hiroshima more thor-
ough destruction near ground zero, without signifi-
cant los in the scope of destruction, could have
been achieved had the bomb been detonated at a
lower altitude.
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r
FIRE FRINGE. 8,200 feet from ground zero tit agasaki, the old police station was completely gutted
fire. Hills protected houses on the right from blast. and fire did not spread to them (Japanese photo).
BLAST BUCKLED THE COLUMNS of this wood lrame building, beyond the fire fringe
at Hiroshima (7,600 feet ft'om ground zero).
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WRECKAGE I AGASAKI STREETCAR TERMINAL 1,500 feet nortb of gl'Ound zero.
Streetcar in celzter was bloum about 6 feet by tbe blast (Japauese pboto).
THE HIROSHIMA FIRE DEPARTME T lost its only aerial ladder truck wben the west
side main fire station was destroyed by blast alld fire, 4,000 feet from gl'ound zero (Japa-
nese photo),
32
Effort and resllits
March 1945, and the average effort and results
from the Twentieth Air Force's campaign against
Japanese cities:
What stands out from this compilation, even
more than the extent of the destruction from a
single concentrated source, is the unprecedented
casualty rate from the combination of heat, blast,
and gamma rays from the chain reaction.
On the basis of the Imown destructiveness of
various bombs computed from the war in Europe
and the Pacific and from tests, the Survey has es-
timated the striking force that would have been
necessary to achieve the ame destruction at Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki. To cause physical damage
equivalent to that caused by the atomic bombs,
approximately 1,300 tons of bombs (one-fourth
high explosives and three-fourths incendiaries)
at Hiroshima and 600 tons (three-fourths high
explosives and one-fourth incendiary) wouldliave
been required at Naga aki-in the target area.
To place that many bombs in the target area, as-
suming daylight attacks under e sentially the same
conditions of weather and enemy opposition that
prevailed when the atomic bombs were dropped,
it is estimated that 1,600 tons of bombs would have
had to be dropped at Hiroshima and 900 tons at
Nagasaki. To these bomb loads would have had
to be added a number of tons of antipersonnel
fragmentation bomb to inflict comparable cas-
ualties. These would add about 500 tons at Hiro-
shima and 300 lons at Nagasaki. The total bomb
load would thu be 2,100 tons at Hiroshima (400
HE, 1,200 IB) and 1,200 ~ons (675 HE, 225 IB)
at Nagasaki. "Vith each plane carrying 10 tons,
the attacking force required "'ould have been 210
B-29s at Hiroshima and 120 B-29s at Nagasaki.
It should be kept in mind, however, that the area
of damage at Nagasaki does not represent the full
potential effectiveness of the atomic bomb used
there. The damage was limited by the small size
of the rather isolated section of the city over which
the bomb exploded. Had the target been suffi-
ciently large, with no sections protected by inter-
vening hills, the area of damage would have been
about five times as large. An equivalent bomb
load which would correspond to the destructive
power of the Nagasaki bomb rather than the im-
:perfect results achieved would approximate 2,200
tons of high explosives and incendiaries for physi-
cal damage plus 500 tons ot fragmentation bombs
for casualties, a total of 270 B-29 loads of 10 tons
each.
Nagasaki Tokyo
I 279 173
11 21,667 '1,129
65,000 130,000 (3)
1.8 15.8 1.8
35140,000 83,600 1.850
40,000 102,000 1,830
20.000 5,300 1,000
43,000 11,800 2,000
• Unknown.
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E. THE ATOMIC BOMB COMPARED WITH
OTHER WEAPONS
In comparing the atomic bomb with other
weapons, it is well to remember the importance of
the height at which it exploded. Because of this
distance from the targets, the atomic bombs did
not" exert at any point in Hiroshima or Nagasaki
the high instantaneous peak pres ures of even
small high explosive bombs. For example, a
single 100-pound bomb exploding at ground level
exerts a higher blast pressure over an area of 1,000
square feet (for about 1 feet around its point of
detonation) than did the atomic bomb at any
point in either city.
That fact will place comparisons of the radii of
effectiveness in the proper perspective. Even at
the heights from ,Yhich the atomic bomb was ex-
ploded in Japan, its blast effects were on a new
scale because the duration of the blast was 10nO'
'"compared to that of high explosive bombs. To
take only one example: At Nagasaki, brick build-
ings suffered structural damage within a radius
averaging 6,000 feet from ground zero. Compara-
ble damage would be done by a 500-pound high ex-
plosive bomb burst at ground level for a radius of
<.15 feet; by a 1,000-pound bomb for 80 feet; by a
I-ton bomb for 110 feet; and by a 2-ton bomb for
200 feet. A hypothetical10-ton blockbuster (only
10-ton penetrating bombs have actually been used)
could be expected to achieve equivalent damage
over a radius of 400 feet. The area of effectiveness
of the air-burst atomic bomb again t brick build-
ings tlm ranged from 15,000 times as great as that
for a 500-pound bomb to 225 times as great as that
for the imaginary 10-ton blockbuster.
A simple table shows most strikingly the com-
parison between the striking forces needed for:
atomic and for conventional raids. Against the
two atomic attacks can be set the data for the most
effective single urban attack. that on Tokyo on 9
Planes........................... 1
Bomb load....................... I 1
Population density per square
mile_.......................... 35,000
Square miles destroyed. 4.7
Killed and missing 70/80,000
Injured.......................... 70,000
Mortality rate per square mile
destroyed...................... 15,000
Casualty rate per square mile.... 32,000
DESTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS WITH BRICK LOAD BEARI lG WALLS. Note how
brick debris lies imide wall facing blast, at remains of a barracks at the Japanese A"my
Divisional Grounds, 4,200 feet from g1"Otmd zel'O at Hiroshima. The Koa Fire Imttra/lce
Co., 1,300 feet from gl'ound ZC1"O, is completely destroyed except for the heavy walls of
the vault.
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REINFORCED CONCRETE BUILDINGS STILL STAND-but note how the interiors, as in
the operating room of t/Je agasaki University Hospital (2,200 feet from ground zero), are
bm'nt out. Fi,'e has consumed the floor, the balcony, and aU seats, a1zd distm'ted the metal
railings and pipe.
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IV. SIGNPOSTS
A. THE DANGER
The Survey's inve tigators, as they proceeded
about tlleir study, found an insistent question
framing itself in their mind : "What if the target
for the bomb had been an American City~" True,
the primary mission of the Survey was to ascer-
tain the facts just summarized. But conclusions
as to the meaning of those facts. for citizens of
the United States, forced themselves almost in-
escapably on the men who examined thoughtfully
the remains of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These
conclusions have a different sort of validity from
the measurable and ponderable facts of preceding
sections, and therefore they are presented sepa-
rately. They are not the least important part of
this report, however, and they are stated with no
less conviction.
No two cities, whether in Japan or the United
States, are exactly alike. But the differences in
terrain, layout and zoning, density, and type of
construction can be allowed for one by'one; when
that is done, comparison become possible. The
most striking difference between American and
Japanese cities is in residential districts: what
happened to typical Japanese homes is not directly
applicable to American residential districts. But
in Japanese cities were many brick and wood frame
buildings of Western or similar desi gn and of good
workmanship. It was the opinion of the Survey's
engineers, with their professional familiarity with
American buildings, that these Japanese buildinas
reacted to the bomb much as typical American
buildings would have. And these buildings were
exceedingly vulnerable: multi-story brick build-
ings with load-bearing walls were destroyed or
seriously damaged over an area of 3.6 square miles
at Hiroshima, while similar one-story brick build-
ings were destroyed or seriously damaged within
an area of 6 square miles. Wood frame buildings
built as industrial or commercial shops suffered
similar damage in an area of over 8 miles, while
Japanese residences were destroyed or seriously
damaged within an area of 6 square miles. This
36
was at Hiroshima, where the less powerful bomb
was used!
These figures indicate what would happen to
typical wood, brick, and tucco structures in Amer-
ican cities. Modern reinforced concrete and steel
frame buildings would fare better here-as they
did in Japan. But the following table shows ho~
American cities are built, and how few buildings
are of blast-resistant construction.
Types of structures by exterior material (United
States cities)
City -
ITotal Otherstructures Woo4 Brick Stucco
reported materials!
--~
---
--~
---
New York _______ h ___ 591. 319 236,879 299.48'2 41,661 13,297
Washington ____ h _____ 156,359 411,971 95,939 5.764 5,685
Chicago_______________ 382,628 131,148 238.95P 5,797 6,724
Detroit___________ h_h 267,677 165.488 94,333 1,923 5,933
San Francisco_________ 105, ISO 61,172 2,334 40,902 722
Source: SLxteenth Census of tbe United States (1940), vol. II.
1 Includes blast-resistant buildings.
The overwhelming bulk of the buildings ill
American cities could not stand up against an
atomic bomb bursting a mile or a mile and a half
from them.
And the people ~ We must not too readily dis-
count the casualty rate because of the teeming
populations of congested Japanese cities. Ameri-
can cities, too, have their crowded slums, and in
addition tend to build vertically S9 that the den-
sity of the population is high in a given area
even though each apartment dweller may have
more living space than his Japanese equivalent.
Mo t of the population densities in this table are
merely averages for people within a city limits.
Most meaningful, therefore, are the figures for the
central areas of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and for
the boroughs of New York. The casualty rates
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, applied to the massed
inhabitants of Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the
Bronx, yield a grim conclusion. These casualty
rates, it must never be forgotten, result from the
first atomic bombs to be used and from bombs burst
DAMAGE TO MACHINE TOOLS was usually indirect. At the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms
If/01'ks, 4,200 feet /1'om ground zero at Nagasaki, many closely packed machines escaped
serious damage from collapsing t'oof tt'usses, but were exposed to the weather. Other
machines wet'e torn from their fOlmdations by collapsing steel members.
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prepare to mllllmlze the destructiveness of such
attacks, and so organize the economic and admin-
istrative life of the Nation that no single or small
group of successful attacks can paralyze the na-
tional organism. The foregoing description of
the effectiveness of th~ atomic bomb has shown
clearly that, despite its awesome power, it has
limits of which wise planning will take prompt
advantage.
1. Shelters.-The most instructive fact at Naga-
saki was the survival, even when near ground zero,
of the few hundred people who were properly
placed in the tunnel shelters. Carefully built
shelters, though unoccupied, stood up well in both
cities. Without question, shelters can protect those
who get to them against anything but a direct hit.
Adequate warning will assure that a maximum
number get to sh.eIters.
Analysis of the protection of survivors within a
few hundred feet of ground zero shows that shield-
ing is possible even against gamma rays. At
Hiroshima, for example, persons in a concrete
building 3,600 feet from ground zero showed no
clinical effects from gamma radiation, but those
protected only by wooden buildings at a similar
distance suffered from radiation disease. The
necessary thickness varies with the substance and
with the distance from the point of detonation.
Adequate shelters can be built which will reduce
substantially the casualties from radiation.
Men arriving at Hiroshima and Nagasaki have
been constantly impressed by the shells of rein-
forced concrete buildings still rising above the
rubble of brick and stone or the ashes of wooden
buildings. In most cases gutted by fire or stripped
of partitions and int~riortrim, these buildings have
a double lesson for us. They show, first, that it is
possible without excessive expense to erect build-
ings which will sati factoriiy protect their con-
tents at distance of about 2,000 feet or more from
a bomb of the types so far employed. Construction
of such buildings would be similar to earthquake
resistant construction, which California experience
indicates would cost about 10 percent to 15 percent
more than conventional construction. Even
against more powerful bombs or against near
mi ses, such construction would dimini h damage.
Second, the internal damage illustrates the danger
from interior details and construction which re-
sult in fire or flying debris in otherwise sound
buildings. The elimination of combustible in-
teriors and the provision of full-masonry partition
7,000
65,000
12,750
35,000
23,200
145,000
76,000
34,000
34,200
11,000
3,000
11,000
J6,500
11,750
14,250
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3.4
26.5
4.0
322.8
22.2
22.2
41.4
80.9
121.1
57.2
61. 4
206.7
137.9
44.6
Area sQ.
mi.
'340,000
, 140,000
'250.000
, 220,000
7,492,000
3,200,000
1,689,000
J, 493, 700
2,792,000
1,340,500
176.200
663.09\
3,396,808
1,623.452
634,536
Population densities
nited States and
Japanese cities
Population
Population
1----.---1 density per
SQ. mile
City
Hiroshima . _. _. _U __ . __ . _. _
Center of citY_m hhh __ uh.
Nagasaki. _u. __ nU. nnU __
Built-up arcsuu .Uh_UU __ n __
New York.. unu.hh.u.hhh.
Manhattan (day) .... h _
Manhattan (nigbt) _
Bronx . . .... __
Brooklyn .. __ h __ h' h hh. __
Queens_u . u n h _
Staten Islandhh n . nn _nO_
Washington n __ u _'hh.U .u_. h.
Cbicago_. . h h __ h. U U __
Detroit. hUn __ U_ n .n h U __
San Francisco_ UhU nn. _n
1 Prewar.
'As of I Aug. 45.
Source: New York: Fortune, July 1939-0tber United States cities: Six-
teentb Census of the United States (1940).
:S. WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT
The danger is real-of that, the Survey's find-
ings leave no doubt. Scattered through those
findings, at the same time, are the clues to the
measures that can be taken to cut down potential
los es of lives and property. These measures
must be taken or initiated now, if their cost is not
to be prohibitive. But if a policy is laid down,
well in advance of any crisis, it will enable timely
decentralization of industrial and medical facili-
ties, construction or blueprinting of shelters, and
preparation for life-saving evacuation programs.
The almost unprotected, completely surprised
cities of Japan suffered maximum losses from
atomic bomb attack. If "e recognize in advance
the possible danger and act to forestall it, we
shall at worst suffer minimum casualties and
disruption.
Since modern science can be marshalled for the
defense as well as the attack, there i reason to
hope that protective weapons and techniques will
be improved. Even protective devices and vigi-
lance, however, cannot be perfect guards against
surprise or initial attack, or against the unlimited
choices of targets offered an enemy through the
range and speed of modern weapons. In our plan-
ning for the future, if we are realistic, we will
at considerable distances above the ground. Im-
proved bombs, perhaps detonated more effectively,
may well prove still more deadly.
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JHEAVY ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT weh as this turbogellerator at Mintlmi Sendamaehi
wbstation 7,700 feet from ground zero at Hiroshima, often mr·vived the explosion.
NAGASAKI. Steel-framed building about 4,000 feet south of ground zero in Mitwbishi Steel and Arms
W O1·ks distorted to grotesque shape by blast of bomb.
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AGASAKI SHELTERS. Tunnel shelters in the hillside, such as
close to gl"ound zero), protected tbe few occupants /loom blast,
/Ill
HIROSHIMA EARTH-A D-POLE AIR-RAID SHELTER. This simple shelter is undamaged by fire and blast
5,000 feet tlOrtheast of grotmd zero, though surrounding buildings have beett destroyed (Japallese photo, 10
August 1945).
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walls, fire-resistive stair and elevator enclosures,
and fire division walls would localize fires. Avoid-
ance of glass, tile, or lath and plaster on wood stud
would cut down damage from flying debris. The
studies of the Physical Damage Division of the
Survey support such recommendations and in-
clude many others.
The survival of sheltered sections of Nagasaki
uggests forcefully the use that can be made of
irregular terrain. Uneven ground reduces the
spread and uniformity of blast effect. Terrain
features such as rivers and parks afford natural
firebreaks and avenues of escape.
2. Decent1'alization.-Hiroshima and Nagasaki
were chosen a~ targets because of their concentra-
tion of activities and population. The population
density of 45,000 or more per square mile of built-
up area explains in part the high casualty rate.
Significant therefore is the fact that deaths at
Nagasaki, despite the greater population density,
were only one-half those at Hiroshima: the dif-
ference can be assigned in the main to the sep-
aration of the dispersed built-up pockets at Naga-
saki, in contrast to the uniform concentration of
the inhabitants in the heart of Hiroshima. The
Nagasaki bomb thus dissipated much of its energy
against hills, water, or unoccupied areas, while the
Hiroshima bomb achieved almost optimum effect.
The fate of industries in both cities again illus-
h'ates the value of decentralization. All major
factories in Hiroshima were on the periphery of
the city-and escaped serious damage; at Naga-
aki, plants and dockyards at the southern end
of the city were left intact, but those in the val-
ley where the bomb exploded were seriously dam-
aged. So spread out were the industries in both
cities that no single bomb could have been sig-
nificantly more effective than the two actually
dropped.
Medical facilities, crowded into the heart of the
city rather than evenly spread through it, were
crippled or wiped out by the explosion. Only the
previous removal of some stocks of medical up-
plies from Hiroshima to outlying communities, and
the bringing in of aid, enabled the limited medical
attention of the first few days.
These results underline those in conventional
area raids in Germany, where frequently the
heart of a city was devastated while peripheral
industries continued to produce and where (par-
ticularly in Hamburg) destruction of medical fa-
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cilities just at the time of greatest need hampered
care of wounded.
The similar peril of American cities and the ex-
tent to which wise zoning has diminished it differ
from city to city. Though a reshaping and partial
dispersal of the national centers of activity are
clra tic and difficult measures, they represent a
social and military ideal toward which very prac-
tical steps can be taken once the policy has been
laid down. In the location of plants, administra-
tive headquarters, and hospitals particularly, the
value of decentralization is obvious, and can be
obtained cheaply if the need is foreseen. For
example, by wi e selection of dispersed sites, the
present hospital building program of the Veterans'
Administration could be made to lessen our con-
gestion without additional cost.
Reserve stocks of critical materials and of such
products as medical supplies should be kept on
hanel. This principle of maintaining reserves ap-
plies also to the capital equipment of the country.
Key producing areas must not be served by a single
source of power or channel of transportation. In-
dispensable materials must not C~)Jl1e from proc-
essing plant of barely adequate capacity. Pro-
duction of essential manufactured goods-civilian
and military-must not be confined to a few or to
geographically centralized plants. And the vari-
ous regions of the country should be encouraged to
approach balanced economic development as
closely as is naturally possible. An enemy view-
ing our national economy must not find bottlenecks
which use of the atomic bomb could choke off to
throttle our productive capacity.
3. Oimilian defen8e.-Becau e the scale of dis-
aster would be certain to overwhelm the locality
in which it occurs, mutual assistance organized on
a national level i essential. Such national or-
ganization is by no means inconsistent with de-
centralization; indeed, it will be aided by the
existence of the maximum number of nearly
sel£-su taining regions whose joint support it
can coordinate. In addition, highly trained mo-
bile units skilled in and equipped for fire fight-
ing, rescue work, and clearance and repair should
be trained for an emergency which disrupts local
organization and exceeds its capability for control.
Most important, a national civilian defense or-
ganization can prepare now the plans for neces-
sary steps in case of crisis. Two complementary
programs which should be worked out in advance
are those for evacuation of unnecessary inhabitants
THIS STEEL FRAME BUILDING, 2,000 feet f1"Om ground zero at Hit'osbima, had its first-
stm'y columns buckle away It'om the blast, dt'opping the second stm'y to tbe ground,
Combustibles were destroyed by /ire.
COLLAPSE OF REINFORCED CONCRETE BUILDING. Chugoku Coal Distt'ibution Con-
trol Co., 700 feet from ground zero at Hiroshima.
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from threatened urban areas, and for rapid erec-
tion of adequate shelters for people who must
remain.
4. Active defeme.-Protective measures can sub-
stantially reduce the degree of devastation from an
atomic bomb and the rate of casualties. Yet if the
possibility of atomic attack on us is accepted, we
must accept also the fact that no defensive meas-
ures alone can long protect us. At best they can
minimize our losses and preserve the functioning
of the national community through initial or con-
tinuing partial attack. Against full and sustained
attacks they would be ineffectual palliatives.
As defensive weapons, atomic bombs are useful
primarily as .warnings, as threats of retaliation
which will restrain a potential aggressor from
their use as from the use of poison gas or biological
warfare. The mission of active defense, as of
passive defen e, is thus to prevent the surprise
use of the atomic bomb from being decisive. A
wise military establishment will make sure-by
dispersal, concealment, protection, and constant
readiness of its forces-that no single blow or
series of blows from an enemy can cripple its
ability to strike back in the same way or to repel
accompanying attacks from other air, ground, or
sea forces. The measures to enable this unrelax-
ing state of readiness are not new; only their
urgency is increased. Particularly is this true of
the intelligence activities on which informed de-
cisions and timely actions depend.
The need for research is not limited to atomic
energy itself, but is equally important in propel-
lants, detection devices, and other techniques of
countering and of delivering atomic weapons.
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Also imperative is the testing of the weapon's
potentialities under varying conditions. The com-
ing Operation Crossroads, for example, will give
valuable data for defining more precisely what is
already known about the atomic bomb's effective-
ness when air-burst; more valuable, however, will
be tests under new conditions, to provide sure in-
formation about detonations at water level or
under water, as well as underground. While pre-
diction of effects under differing conditions of
detonation may have a high degree of probability,
verified kno'wledge is a much better basis for mili-
tary planning.
5. Oonclusion.-One further measure of safety
must accompany the others. To avoid destruction,
the surest way is to avoid war. This was the
Survey's recommendation after viewing the rubble
of German cities, and it holds equally true whether
one remembers the ashes of Hiroshima or consid-
ers the vulnerability of American cities.
Our national policy has consistently had as one
of its basic principles the maintenance of peace.
Based on our ideals of justice and of peaceful de-
velopment of our resources, this disinterested pol-
icy has been reinforced by our clear lack of any-
thing to gain from war--even in victory. J o more
forceful arguments for peace and for the inter-
national machinery of peace than the sight of the
devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have ever
been devised. As the developer and exploiter of
this ominous weapon, our nation has a responsi-
bility, which no American should shirk, to lead in
establishing and implementing the international
guarantees and controls which will prevent its
future use.
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